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Ending the Internal Affairs Farce  
RACHEL MORAN† 
INTRODUCTION 
Trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect 
and serve is essential in a democracy. It is key to the stability of our 
communities, the integrity of our criminal justice system, and the safe 
and effective delivery of policing services.1 
 I don’t trust the police because I can’t.2 
On October 20, 2014, Chicago police officer Jason Van 
Dyke, a white man, shot and killed Laquan McDonald, a 
seventeen-year-old black teenager who had his back turned 
when Van Dyke fired the first of sixteen shots.3 Van Dyke 
continued to shoot even after McDonald lay writhing—and 
dying—on the pavement.4 Five fellow police officers who 
witnessed the shooting filed reports claiming that McDonald 
was aggressively moving toward the officers when Van Dyke 
shot him—claims that video footage from the incident 
  
† Clinical Teaching Fellow, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; J.D., 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. I am thankful to many people for their thoughtful 
insights during the writing process, most particularly Professors Christopher N. 
Lasch and Robin Walker Sterling. I am also grateful to Professor Laurie Levenson 
and Ron Safer for offering their insights and experience in combating police 
misconduct. Any mistakes are my responsibility alone. 
 1.  PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT 1 
(2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf. 
 2. Keith Reed, I Don’t Trust the Police Because I Can’t, EBONY (Sept. 18, 2013), 
http://www.ebony.com/news-views/i-dont-trust-the-police-because-i-cant-
304#axzz3gXMPq6eE. 
 3. See Warning, Graphic Content: Laquan McDonald Shooting Dash-cam 
Video, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
breaking/ct-laquan-mcdonald-police-dashboard-short-video-premiumvideo.html; 
see also Timothy Williams, Chicago Rarely Penalizes Officers for Complaints, 
Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/us/
few-complaints-against-chicago-police-result-in-discipline-data-shows.html?smi
d=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0. 
 4. See sources cited supra note 3. 
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contradicts.5 The City of Chicago refused to release squad car 
footage of the shooting for more than a year after McDonald’s 
death, until a Cook County court finally ordered it do so.6 
After the video was released and Van Dyke was charged with 
first degree murder, Chicago residents learned that Van 
Dyke had been named in eighteen prior civilian complaints 
for incidents ranging from excessive force to racial slurs, and 
not one of those prior complaints had ever been sustained.7 
Mayor Rahm Emanuel demanded the resignations of both 
the City’s police commissioner and the head of the review 
board responsible for investigating police misconduct claims, 
and pledged to “dramatically improv[e] our system of police 
accountability.”8 
One month after Laquan McDonald’s death, Timothy 
Loehmann, a white police officer in Cleveland, shot and killed 
Tamir Rice, a twelve-year-old African American boy who was 
playing in the park with a toy gun.9 Loehmann, who killed 
Tamir just seconds after arriving at the park in response to 
a 911 call of a boy with a “probably fake” gun, had resigned 
from his previous job as a police officer after experiencing a 
  
 5. Monica Davey, Officers’ Statements Differ from Video in Death of Laquan 




 6. See Jason Meisner & Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Forgoes Appeal After Judge 
Orders Release of Video of Fatal Police Shooting, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 20, 2015), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-judge-orders-release-of-
video-showing-fatal-shooting-by-police-officer-20151119-story.html. 
 7. Williams, supra note 3.  
 8. Jon Seidel, Police Review Authority Boss Ousted, CHI. SUN TIMES (Dec. 6, 
2015), http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/7/71/1158836/police-review-authority-
boss-ousted; accord Mitch Smith, Mayor of Chicago Announces Measures to Curb 




 9. Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges 
in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html?smid=tw-
nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0. 
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“dangerous loss of composure” when handling firearms.10 
More than a year after Tamir’s death, Cuyahoga County’s 
chief prosecutor recommended that Loehmann not be 
indicted for killing Tamir,11 but claimed that the lessons the 
city learned from the case would ensure that “Tamir will not 
have died in vain.”12 Cleveland’s mayor told his constituents 
that city officials had done “a lot of soul searching” after 
Tamir’s death, and promised that increasing accountability 
for police misconduct would be a priority for his 
administration.13 
In April of 2015, North Charleston police officer Michael 
Slager shot and killed Walter Scott, an unarmed African 
American man, who was fleeing with his back to the officer 
when Slager fired eight shots at him from behind.14 Slager, 
who is white, had been named in a prior complaint for using 
his taser on an African American man with no justification, 
slamming the man to the ground, and dragging him away.15 
Slager had also been cited in a separate incident for failing 
to file a police report on behalf of an African American woman 
who complained that her children were being harassed.16 An 
internal investigation into the excessive force claim cleared 
Slager within weeks without ever contacting the complainant 
  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Prosecutor McGinty Responds to NAACP Request for Tamir Rice Grand 
Jury Documents, WKYC (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.wkyc.com/story/news/
local/cleveland/tamir-rice-shooting/2016/01/06/naacp-asks-grand-jury-
documents-tamir-rice-case/78373754. 
 13. Williams & Smith, supra note 9; Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson on 
Accountability, Police Reform and His Vision for the Future of Policing, NEWSONE 
(Mar. 2015), http://newsone.com/3096051/cleveland-mayor-frank-jackson-on-
accountability-police-reform-and-his-vision-for-the-future-of-policing-video. 
 14. Ashley Fantz & Holly Yan, Dash Cam Video Shows the Moments Before 
South Carolina Police Shooting, CNN (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/
2015/04/09/us/south-carolina-police-shooting. 
 15. Ray Sanchez, Officer Michael Thomas Slager of South Carolina: What We 
Know about Him, CNN (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/08/us/south-
carolina-michael-slager. 
 16. Id. 
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to obtain his side of the story.17 In the wake of national 
outrage over Scott’s death, North Charleston’s mayor pledged 
an independent investigation into the shooting, and promised 
to order body cameras for the police force in order to improve 
officer accountability.18 
Police officers across the United States killed 2318 people 
between January 1, 2014 and December 31, 2015.19 Several 
of those victims—McDonald, Rice, Scott, Michael Brown, Eric 
Garner, Akai Gurley, Freddie Gray, and Samuel DuBose, to 
name just a few of the unarmed black men killed by police—
have in their deaths become the focal points of further public 
outrage, protests, and rioting.20 In the wake of these tragic 
  
 17.  Associated Press, Cop Who Shot Black Man in Back Had Earlier Excessive-
Force Complaint, N.Y. POST (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.nypost.com/
2018/04/09/cop-who-shot-black-man-had-prior-excessive-force-complaint-report/. 
 18. See Wesley Lowery & Mark Berman, In North Charleston, Urgent Promises 




 19. See KILLED BY POLICE, http://killedbypolice.net/ (last visited May 30, 2016). 
Because police departments are generally not required to report how many people 
they have killed, and are often resistant to doing so, no precise governmental 
statistics are available regarding these numbers. A group of Harvard Medical 
Scientists recently called on U.S. public health agencies to make police killings a 
“notifiable condition,” which would require police departments to report each 
killing to their corresponding Public Health Department. See Dylan Sevett, 
Harvard Medical Scientists Say Police Killings Should Be Recorded as Public 
Epidemic, U.S. UNCUT (Dec. 27, 2015), http://usuncut.com/black-lives-
matter/harvard-medical-police-killings-public-epidemic/.  
 20. See, e.g., Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s 
Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/
nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html; J. David Goodman & 
Vivian Yee, Officer Charged in Akai Gurley Case Debated Reporting Gunshot, 
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/
12/nyregion/akai-gurley-shooting-death-arraignment.html; Jack Healy, 
Ferguson, Still Tense, Grows Calmer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/michael-brown-darren-wilson-ferguson-
protests.html (discussing the public reaction to the shooting death of Michael 
Brown); Dana Ford & Ed Payne, Ex-university Cop in Samuel DuBose Shooting 
Death Pleads Not Guilty, CNN (July 31, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/
2015/07/30/us/ohio-sam-dubose-tensing; Michael Martinez, Report: Autopsy 
Shows Freddie Gray Suffered ‘High-energy Injury,’ CNN (June 24, 2015), 
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deaths, government officials have spouted many of the same 
platitudes and promises for systemic change within police 
departments, pledging to discipline abusive officers, increase 
accountability, and review departmental policies on use of 
force.21  
These promises—and the travesties from which they 
stem—are hardly new. After four Los Angeles Police 
Department officers were caught on video viciously beating 
Rodney King in 1991, the city of Los Angeles erupted into 
race riots.22 Los Angeles mayor Tom Bradley pledged to 
conduct an investigation into the police department’s 
internal disciplinary system, assuring the public that “[t]he 
men who beat Rodney King do not deserve to wear the 
uniform of the L.A.P.D.”23 Further, U.S. Attorney General 
Dick Thornburgh vowed to review every police brutality 




 21. See, e.g., Chuck Raasch, U.S. Attorney General Announces New Civil Rights 
Probe in Ferguson, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 5, 2014) 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/u-s-attorney-general-
announces-new-civil-rights-probe-in/article_d2cd8f72-69a2-5afe-bbe0-8e4dfb371
477.html (quoting Attorney General Eric Holder’s promise, after Michael Brown’s 
shooting death, to open a “fair, thorough investigation” that would result in 
“lasting, positive change” in the Ferguson Police Department); Andrew Tangel, 
Civil-Rights Leaders Plan Washington March, New York City Mayor Vows Police 
Changes, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2014) http://www.wsj.com/articles/mayor-bill-de-
blasio-promises-overhaul-at-nypd-after-eric-garner-case-1417704263 (quoting 
New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s pledge, after Eric Garner’s death, to improve 
police officer training, and Governor Andrew Cuomo’s pledge to “push for a review 
of police training and procedures”); Garrett W. Haake, Baltimore Mayor Promises 
Answers in Freddie Gray’s Death, WUSA9 (Apr. 20, 2015, 11:45 PM), 
http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/2015/04/20/baltimore-mayor-promises-
answers-in-freddie-gray-death/26106533. 
 22. See George Holliday, Rodney King Beating Video Full Length Footage 
Screener, YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sb1W
ywIpUtY. 
 23. Seth Mydans, The Police Verdict; Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in Taped 
Beating, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/02/08/
home/rodney-verdict.html. 
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six years.24 In 1997, when New York Police Department 
officers falsely arrested and tortured Abner Louima, a black 
Haitian immigrant—injuring him so badly that he remained 
hospitalized for two months25—Mayor Rudy Giuliani publicly 
denounced the officers who attacked Louima, and the U.S. 
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York promised to 
“pull[] out the stops” in prosecuting the abusers.26 Louima 
himself expressed hope that he would become a “symbol for 
change” in the way police officers treated minorities.27 After 
Atlanta police officers shot and killed ninety-two-year-old 
Kathryn Johnston in 2006, and then planted drugs in her 
home in an attempt to cover up their misdeeds, the U.S. 
Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia promised that 
his office would begin investigating a “culture of misconduct” 
within the Atlanta Police Department,28 and the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) issued a press release announcing that 
officers who ignored the Constitution could expect to be 
“vigorously prosecut[ed].”29 And just two years before twelve-
year-old Tamir Rice’s killing, a group of thirteen Cleveland 
police officers fired 137 shots at Timothy Russell and Malissa 
Williams, killing the unarmed African American couple who 
had failed to pull over after a turn signal violation.30 After 
  
 24. Neil A. Lewis, Police Brutality Under Wide Review by Justice Dept., N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/
big/0303.html; Mydans, supra note 23. 
 25. Sewell Chan, The Abner Louima Case, 10 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES: CITY 
ROOM (Aug. 9, 2007), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/09/the-abner-
louima-case-10-years-later.  
 26. Marie Brenner, Incident in the 70th Precinct, VANITY FAIR (Jan. 16, 2007, 
12:00 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/1997/12/louima199712. 
 27. Id. 
 28.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Atlanta Police Officers Charged 
in Connection with the Fatal Shooting of an Elderly Atlanta Woman (Apr. 26, 
2007), http://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/gan/press/2007/04-26-07.pdf. 
 29. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Former Atlanta Police Officers 
Sentenced to Prison in Fatal Shooting of Elderly Atlanta Woman (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-former-atlanta-police-officers-sentenced-
prison-fatal-shooting-elderly-atlanta-woman. 
 30. See, e.g., Matt Schiavenza, ‘This is Straight Murder’: A Troubling Acquittal 
in Cleveland, THE ATLANTIC (May 23, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2015/05/this-is-straight-murder-a-troubling-acquittal-in-cleveland/394
058; Not Guilty: Judge Acquits Cleveland Ptl. Michael Brelo on All Counts, 
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their deaths, the Cleveland police chief assured residents 
that the department would “make sure that any and all 
violations of our policies and procedures will be dealt with.”31 
The tragedy of minorities—particularly black men—
being killed, abused, or harassed at the hands of police 
officers has long been and continues to be one of the great 
civil rights crises for our country. Although the legal 
community has known of and periodically wrung its hands 
about the policing problem for decades, we have made little 
progress in solving it. As lawyers, uniquely situated to 
influence or even dictate the practices of law enforcement, we 
should have a “capacity for moral indignation at injustice” 
that prompts us to seek lasting solutions to the ongoing 
outrage of abusive officers.32  
This Article focuses on one aspect of solving the police 
misconduct crisis: changing how cities review, and respond 
to, citizen complaints about police misconduct. When 
misconduct goes unchecked, it alienates the very people the 
police are intended to serve, allows bad officers to thrive, and 
creates a fertile breeding ground for the abuses that the more 
vulnerable members of our society—especially poor 
minorities—have suffered for decades.33  
The first purpose of this Article is to show that internal 
affairs review—in which the police department itself reviews 
  
NEWSNET5 (June 4, 2015, 6:29 PM), http://www.newsnet5.com/news/local-
news/cleveland-metro/verdict-in-judge-to-announce-decision-in-cleveland-police-
officer-michael-brelos-case.   
 31. Jason Hanna et al., Cleveland Officer Not Guilty in Killing Unarmed Pair, 
CNN (May 23, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/23/us/cleveland-police-verdict. 
 32. I borrow this phrase from Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 
CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 330 (2001). 
 33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROMOTING COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE 
RACIAL PROFILING 21 (2008) (“Being viewed as fair and just is critical to successful 
policing in a democracy. When the police are perceived as unfair in their 
enforcement, it will undermine their effectiveness.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 2, 15 (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/
2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter FERGUSON 
INVESTIGATION] (noting that Ferguson’s pattern of “unconstitutional policing,” 
which has gone unpunished for years, has “undermin[ed] law enforcement 
legitimacy among African Americans in particular”).  
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claims of misconduct by officers within the force—is an 
irresponsible and, frankly, farcical method of responding to 
misconduct claims.34 To echo scholar Walter Katz, the 
“system of internalized criminal investigations has been 
criticized for years for its inherent bias.”35 Repeated incidents 
of police misconduct, and the near-total failure of internal 
review systems to hold officers accountable for that 
misconduct, “perverts the rule of law, makes citizens 
distrustful of authority, and encourages further lawlessness 
by police officers.”36 Saying internal affairs units are the best 
means of protecting citizens from police misconduct is like 
saying foxes are the best guards for the henhouse—a notion 
even small children have found laughable for centuries.37   
The other bookend to this Article is one which remains 
largely unexplored by legal scholars: if we are to end the 
internal affairs farce, what review system should replace it? 
Many cities, recognizing the futility of relying on police 
  
 34. The argument could be made that internal affairs review serves exactly the 
purpose it was intended to accomplish, as it was never actually intended to correct 
police misconduct, but rather to simply stave off and obfuscate civilian attempts 
at holding officers accountable. This is a topic for another piece. For now, I assume 
that readers actually want to solve the problem of police misconduct. 
 35. Walter Katz, Enhancing Accountability and Trust with Independent 
Investigations of Police Lethal Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 235, 238 (2015); 
see also, e.g., John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 
789, 792-802 (2000); Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for 
Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001); Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative 
Federalism and Police Reform: Using Congressional Spending to Promote Police 
Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 353-54 (2011). 
 36. Jacobi, supra note 35, at 802-03; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
CONN., PROTECT, SERVE AND LISTEN: ACCEPTING CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS AT 
CONNECTICUT POLICE DEPARTMENTS 1 (2012), https://www.acluct.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/protectservelisten.pdf (“Effective law enforcement 
depends on public trust in the police, which rests in large part on fair and 
transparent systems for handling civilian complaints of police misconduct.”); 
Christopher R. Green, Reverse Broken Windows, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 265, 271 
(2015) (“Officers who feel they can get away with unnecessarily harsh conduct or 
unjustifiably racially disparate patterns are more likely to feel they can get away 
with violating more serious norms.”). 
 37. See Elyse Bruce, Fox in the Henhouse, HISTORICALLY SPEAKING (MAR. 6, 
2013), https://idiomation.wordpress.com/tag/fox-in-the-henhouse (tracing the 
origins of the “fox guarding the henhouse” proverb to a children’s nursery rhyme, 
a 1589 publication, and the Book of Luke in the New Testament Bible). 
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departments to police themselves, have attempted to 
institute various forms of civilian oversight.38 For the most 
part, these have met with limited success. This is, I believe, 
one of the reasons cities still default to internal review: 
because figuring out how to staff, structure, and implement 
an effective independent review system is just too daunting.  
This Article addresses the crisis of unchecked police 
misconduct in four parts. Part I details the appalling rate at 
which police officers in the United States kill, injure, abuse, 
or otherwise mistreat the people—in most cases, minorities—
they have sworn to protect. Part II explains how internal 
review systems have allowed misconduct to flourish. Part III 
discusses the various independent review systems that some 
cities have adopted, and why they have, on the whole, had 
only marginal success in deterring police misconduct. In Part 
IV, I propose a model for what an effective independent 
review agency could look like—which actors should be 
included in the independent review agency, how the agency 
should be structured, and what kind of authority the agency 
should possess.  
I. THE EFFECTS OF POLICE MISCONDUCT ON COMMUNITIES OF 
COLOR 
Police officers in the United States kill their constituents 
at a stunning rate. In the first twenty-four days of 2015, U.S. 
police officers killed fifty-nine people—well over two per day, 
and four more than police officers in England and Wales 
killed in the last twenty-four years combined.39 In March of 
2015, U.S. police officers killed ninety-seven people, or three 
more than Australian police killed over the twenty-year 
period from 1992 through 2011.40 Even in Utah—hardly 
  
 38. A list of many of the civilian oversight agencies in the country can be found 
on the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement 
(NACOLE) website. See Agency Profiles, NAT’L ASS’N FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF 
LAW ENFORCEMENT, https://nacole.org/nacole-resources/oversight-agencies/links-
to-oversight-agencies-u-s (last visited May 26, 2016). 
 39. Jamiles Lartey, By the Numbers: US Police Kill More in Days Than Other 
Countries Do in Years, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015), http://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2015/jun/09/the-counted-police-killings-us-vs-other-countries. 
 40. Id. 
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known as an epicenter of police violence—fifteen percent of 
homicides from 2010 to 2014 were committed by police 
officers.41  
The victims of police killings are disproportionately 
minorities. African Americans represent just thirteen 
percent of the U.S. population but account for over thirty 
percent of people killed by police.42 Between 2010 and 2014, 
unarmed black people were 3.49 times more likely to be shot 
by police than unarmed white people.43 The number is 
drastically higher in certain large counties: in Miami-Dade 
County, unarmed black people were twenty-two times more 
likely to be shot by police than unarmed white people, and in 
the counties that encompass Los Angeles and New Orleans, 
unarmed black people were ten and nine times more likely, 
respectively, to be victims of police shootings than their white 
counterparts.44 In Cook County, Illinois, which includes the 
city of Chicago, unarmed black people were five times more 
likely to be shot by police than armed white people.45 In 
almost every county in the country, unarmed victims of police 
  
 41. Erin Alberty, Killings by Utah Police Outpacing Gang, Drug, Child-Abuse 
Homicides, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.sltrib.com/
news/1842489-155/killings-by-utah-police-outpacing-gang. 
 42. Sendhil Mullainathan, Police Killings of Blacks: Here is What the Data 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/18/upshot/
police-killings-of-blacks-what-the-data-says.html?_r=0. The disproportionate 
representation of minorities as targets of police suspicions plays out across the 
spectrum of the justice system. See generally, e.g., Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race & 
Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, DÆDALUS, Summer 2010, at 74, 74 
(discussing how the police, courts, and corrections system have systematically 
targeted the “black underclass” for decades); Robynn J.A. Cox, Where Do We Go 
from Here? Mass Incarceration and the Struggle for Civil Rights, ECON. POL’Y 
INST. (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2014/MassIncarcerationReport.pdf. 
 43. Cody T. Ross, The United States Police-Shooting Database: A Multi-Level 
Bayesian Analysis of Racial Bias in Police Shootings at the County-Level in the 
United States, 2011-2014, at 5 (Dec. 8, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534673. These records included both police 
shootings that killed their victims, and shootings where the victims survived. 
 44. Id.; see also Officer Involved: A KPCC Investigation Into Police Shootings 
in Los Angeles County, KPCC, http://projects.scpr.org/officer-involved/#12 (last 
visited May 26, 2016) (discussing how law enforcement officers in Los Angeles 
County fatally shot black people at triple the rate of white people). 
 45. Ross, supra note 43, at 5. 
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shootings were much more likely to be black or Hispanic than 
white.46 The statistics are even worse for young black men: 
during the years 2010 through 2012, black teenagers 
between the ages of fifteen and nineteen were twenty-one 
times more likely to be killed by police than their white 
counterparts.47 
Shootings are not the only kind of terror police officers 
inflict on minorities. Recent investigations by the DOJ’s Civil 
Rights Division have revealed that officers in many cities use 
unconstitutionally excessive force during their encounters 
with minorities,48 stop and frisk minorities without any legal 
justification,49 systematically arrest and charge minorities 
  
 46. Id. at 7. 
 47. Ryan Gabrielson et al., Deadly Force, In Black and White, PROPUBLICA 
(Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-black-and-
white. This statistic is drawn from FBI data for the years 2010-2012. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 5, 28 (“Nearly 90% of 
documented force used by FPD officers was used against African Americans.”); 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE 12-
24 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf 
[hereinafter CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION], (detailing patterns of excessive force by 
Cleveland police officers); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW 
ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 3-9 (2011), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
s3.documentcloud.org/documents/74332/justice-department-report-on-the-new-
orleans.pdf [hereinafter NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION] (discussing “use of 
unreasonable force” by New Orleans police officers). 
 49. New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy, which a federal court found to have 
disproportionately targeted and impacted minorities, is perhaps the most well-
known example of this. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 557 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding NYC’s stop-and-frisk policy unconstitutional, and noting 
that the people subjected to stops were “overwhelmingly people of color, and they 
are justifiably troubled to be singled out when many of them have done nothing 
to attract the unwanted attention”); see also FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 
33, at 18 (describing Ferguson Police Department’s pattern of “suspicionless, 
legally unsupportable stops” of African American residents); Nicole Flatow, If You 
Thought Stop-and-Frisk Was Bad, You Should Know About Jump-Outs, THINK 
PROGRESS (Dec. 10, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/12/
10/3468340/jump-outs. “Jump-out” is the colloquial term many Washington, D.C. 
residents use to describe unmarked police cars whose occupants conduct surprise 
stops and frisks of unsuspecting residents. According to Flatow, jump-outs are 
“for many black residents the mark of policing problems in the nation’s capital: 
militaristic, seemingly arbitrary, and reeking of racial disparity.” Id.; U.S. DEP’T. 
OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT 2, 16 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/PE2D-2LBG?type=pdf [hereinafter NEWARK INVESTIGATION] 
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for nonviolent crimes far more aggressively than they enforce 
similar crimes in white communities,50 and arrest poor 
minorities—subjecting many of them to jail time—for minor 
unpaid fines.51  
Not surprisingly, the relationship between police 
departments and minority communities has been fraught 
with tension for years. Gallup polls conducted biannually 
since 1985 show that, over the past thirty years, consistently 
less than one-half of surveyed minorities nationwide express 
confidence that the police will either serve or protect them, 
and many believe that the police would be willing to use 
excessive force on them.52 Sadly, this fear is justified: as civil 
rights scholar Kami Chavis Simmons has written: 
  
(finding that the Newark Police Department stops minorities at a far greater rate 
than whites, often with no constitutional justification). 
 50. FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 4-5 (noting that Ferguson 
police enforced certain minor offenses, such as traffic offenses or failure to comply 
with police orders, “almost exclusively” against African Americans); see also Alec 
Karakatsanis, Policing, Mass Imprisonment, and the Failure of American 
Lawyers, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 253, 256 (2015) (“If nonviolent criminal laws 
were enforced on college campuses or investment banks for just a single day in 
the same rates as in poor communities, there would be twenty-four-hour news 
vans outside of every local jail and immediate public hearings about the 
harshness and efficacy of our legal system.”); Flatow, supra note 49 (noting that 
black people in Washington, D.C. were, as of 2014, eight times more likely than 
white people to be arrested for marijuana possession).  
 51. See FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 2-4 (describing how the 
Ferguson police department’s emphasis on generating city revenue by ticketing 
citizens, and arresting them for unpaid fines, “raise[s] due process concerns and 
inflict[s] unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson community”); id. at 2 
(“[M]any officers appear to see some residents, especially those who live in 
Ferguson’s predominantly African-American neighborhoods, less as constituents 
to be protected than as potential offenders and sources of revenue.”); 
Karakatsanis, supra note 50, at 262-63 (discussing the rise of “modern debtors’ 
prisons” in which local police routinely arrest and incarcerate poor people for 
failing to pay fines they cannot afford to pay); see generally AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS PRISONS (Oct. 2010) 
(discussing the incarceration of defendants unable to pay their legal debts).  
 52. Justin McCarthy, Nonwhites Less Likely to Feel Police Protect and Serve 
Them, GALLUP (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179468/nonwhites-
less-likely-feel-police-protect-serve.aspx. While the percentage of white people 
who expressed confidence in the police has risen as high as seventy-two percent 
during this same time period, the percentage of minorities expressing the same 
confidence has never been over fifty-two percent, and has fallen as low as thirty-
2016] THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS FARCE 849 
 
[i]f the distrust among minority communities was simply due to 
misperceptions or unsubstantiated allegations of police bias, it 
might be easier to develop solutions to ease this distrust. 
Unfortunately, empirical evidence supports the notion that African 
Americans’ perceptions of mistreatment and differential treatment 
by the criminal-justice system are in fact substantiated.53  
A report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights backs 
up this claim, noting that poor people and minorities have 
consistently borne the brunt of police brutality, harassment, 
and misconduct.54 The report concluded, “[i]n their eagerness 
to achieve important goals such as lowering crime, some 
police officers overstep their authority, trample on 
individuals’ civil rights, and may cause entire communities 
to fear the same people they hired and trusted to protect 
them.”55 Violence directed toward poor minorities has been a 
“common characteristic of police abuse in America” for 
decades.56 
  
three percent. Id.; see also Jens Manuel Krogstad, Latino Confidence in Local 
Police Lower Than Among Whites, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 28, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/28/latino-confidence-in-local-
police-lower-than-among-whites (concluding that Hispanics are significantly less 
likely than white people to express confidence in the ability of the police to treat 
races equally, avoid excessive force, or do “a good job enforcing the law”). 
 53. Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police 
Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 
412-13 (2010). 
 54. Revisiting Who Is Guarding the Guardians?, U.S. COMM’N ON C.R. (2000), 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/guard/exsum.htm. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Levenson, supra note 35, at 13; see also FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra 
note 33, at 5 (“[D]istrust of the Ferguson Police Department is longstanding and 
largely attributable to Ferguson’s approach to law enforcement.”); NEWARK 
INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 17 (“Newark’s black residents bear the brunt of 
the NPD’s pattern of unconstitutional policing. This undeniable experience of 
being disproportionately affected by the NPD’s unconstitutional policing helps 
explain the community distrust and cynicism that undermines effective policing 
in Newark.”); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and 
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 515 
(2003) (“[S]tudies of public views about the police typically reveal large racial and 
ethnic group differences, with minority group members expressing much more 
negative attitudes about the police and having lower trust and confidence in 
institutions of social control.”); Jeremy Travis et al., Exploring the Role of the 
Police in Prisoner Reentry, NEW PERSP. POLICING BULL., (Nat’l Inst. of Justice) 
850 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
Even the financial costs of police misconduct have not, 
thus far, inspired cities to reform their police departments’ 
treatment of minorities. Over the last decade, Chicago has 
spent more than $520 million on lawsuits related to police 
misconduct claims, many of which involved claims of 
maltreatment of African Americans.57 In fiscal year 2012 
alone, New York City paid a staggering $152 million in tort 
claims, which include misconduct and civil rights violations, 
against the New York City Police Department.58 In 2015, 
Baltimore reached a $6.4 million settlement over the death 
of twenty-five-year-old Freddie Gray, a black man, while in 
police custody.59 Cleveland paid $3 million to the families of 
Timothy Russell and Malissa Williams, the unarmed African 
  
July 2012, at 3, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238337.pdf (noting that in 
some communities, cooperation with police is considered “tantamount to working 
with the enemy”). Although the victims of police shootings are generally men, 
minority women have also long borne the brunt of police brutality. See, e.g., Zoe 
Carpenter, The Police Violence We Aren’t Talking About, THE NATION (Aug. 27, 
2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/police-violence-we-arent-talking-about; 
Chaédria Labouvier, How Many Viral Videos Will It Take? Another Reminder of 
the Vulnerability of the Black Girl in America, ELLE (Oct. 28, 2015), 
http://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/a31527/do-we-need-another-video-to-
remind-us-that-black-girls-are-the-most-vulnerable (“Do we need more videos of 
black girls dragged across school floors and front lawns to know that this is how 
black women are treated when they have the misfortune of encountering the 
police and the white male rage that so often seems part and parcel of the job?”); 
Erick A. Paulino, Deconstructing the Arrest of Sandra Bland, THE FEMINIST WIRE 
(Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.thefeministwire.com/2015/08/deconstructing-the-
arrest-of-sandra-bland (“in challenging . . . police brutality against people of 
color, #BlackLivesMatter activism must pay particular attention to how police 
exercise force differently for men and women”).  
 57. Andrew Schroedter, Beyond Burge, BETTER GOV’T ASS’N (Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://www.bettergov.org/beyond_burge/; see also Mitch Smith & Monica Davey, 
Chicago to Pay $5 Million to Victims of Police Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/us/chicago-to-pay-5-million-to-victims-of-
police-abuse.html?_r=0. 
 58. JOHN C. LIU, CITY OF NEW YORK: OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, CLAIMS 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 5, 43, 44 chart 18 (2013), http://comptroller.nyc.gov/
wp-content/uploads/documents/2013_Claims-Report.pdf. 
 59. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Baltimore Announces $6.4 Million Settlement in the 
Death of Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/09/09/us/freddie-gray-baltimore-police-death.html?smid=tw-
bna&_r=0. 
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American couple who police officers shot at 137 times,60 and 
reached a separate settlement with the DOJ over patterns of 
abusive policing.61 The Albuquerque Police Department was 
ordered to pay $4.25 million to the estate of a man killed by 
Albuquerque police officers,62 and, in a separate case, the City 
of Albuquerque was found liable for $10 million in damages 
to the estate of a military veteran shot and killed by police.63 
The City of Charlotte, North Carolina settled a wrongful 
death lawsuit brought by the family of Jonathan Ferrell, a 
black man killed by a white police officer, for $2.25 million.64 
Many other cities are paying the heavy costs of defending 
their police departments against civil rights lawsuits alleging 
patterns and practices of abusive policing.65 
  
 60. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 9. 
 61. Mitch Smith & Matt Apuzzo, Cleveland Reaches Settlement with Justice 
Department over Police Conduct, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/cleveland-police.html?_r=0. 
 62. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF ALBUQUERQUE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 11 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/apd_
findings_4-10-14.pdf [hereinafter ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION]. In 2013 the 
Albuquerque Police Department settled another case, involving the death of 
another man at the hands of Albuquerque police officers, for $900,000. Id. at 12.  
 63. Id. at 13. 
 64. Jonathan M. Katz, Trial Opens for Charlotte Officer Who Fatally Shot 
Black Motorist Seeking Help, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/us/trial-opens-for-charlotte-officer-who-
fatally-shot-black-motorist-seeking-help.html. The criminal trial against Ferrell’s 
killer ended in a hung jury, and the Charlotte prosecutor’s office has announced 
that it has no intention of retrying the officer. Jonathan Katz, No Retrial for North 
Carolina Officer Who Killed Unarmed Man, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/us/jonathan-ferrell-police-
shooting.html?_r=0.  
 65. See e.g., Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1028 (9th Cir. 
2015) (reversing grant of summary judgment motion in favor of city, and finding 
that reasonable jury could have found that City of Long Beach was “aware that 
[a police officer] had previously used excessive force when making arrests, but 
had taken no steps to curb his propensity”); Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 
3d 208, 222 (D.N.J. 2015) (finding that plaintiff in a § 1983 lawsuit “provided 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the City [of 
Camden] was deliberately indifferent in investigating claims of excessive force” 
by police officers); Galindez v. Miller, 285 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197-99 (D. Conn. 2003) 
(denying summary judgment for similar reasons). 
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Identifying the problem is one thing; fixing it is another. 
After decades of violent policing, periodic protests, and calls 
for reform, our country still wrestles with the same issues, 
and can point to little or no progress. Just one recent example 
of the grave disconnect between police departments and 
many people of color is the hashtag #IfIDieInPoliceCustody, 
which began trending on Twitter in July of 2015 after the 
suspicious death of Sandra Bland, an African American 
woman who had been arrested after a minor traffic violation, 
and died while in custody of the Waller County, Texas 
Sheriff’s Office.66 In Los Angeles, protesters recently made 
news for disrupting meetings of the Los Angeles Police 
Commission, demanding greater transparency in officer use-
of-force investigations and appointment of a community 
activist to the Police Commission.67 Movements like Black 
Lives Matter are demanding policing reform in nearly every 
major city across the country.68 But when citizens complain 
  
 66. See, e.g., Taryn Finley, #IfIDieInPoliceCustody: Twitter Responds to 
Sandra Bland’s Death with Heartbreaking Hashtag, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/twitter-responds-to-the-suspiciousn
ess-of-sandra-blands-death-with-ifidieinpolicecustody_55a8feeee4b04740a3dfa
386. Some of the tweets included: “#IfIDieInPoliceCustody tell them I sagged my 
pants, smoked weed, and wore hoodies. Ask them if those things warranted my 
execution.” @See_Say_92, TWITTER (July 16, 2015, 4:57 PM) https://
twitter.com/See_Say_92/status/621831095911251968?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw; 
“#IfIDieInPoliceCustody Don’t call for peace. Call for action.” @MalePocahontas, 
TWITTER, (July 16, 2015, 5:29 PM), https://twitter.com/MalePocahontas
/status/621839019899355136?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw; and “#IfIDieInPolice
Custody my murderer will go free & America will blame me” @Fiorentina5, 
TWITTER (Dec. 28, 2015, 1:31 PM), https://twitter.com/Fiorentina5/
status/681588213941587968. The trooper who arrested Bland was later charged 
with perjury, for filing an affidavit claiming that he removed Bland from her car 
only in order to conduct a safe traffic stop investigation. See David Montgomery, 
Texas Trooper Who Arrested Sandra Bland Is Charged with Perjury, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/us/texas-grand-jury-sandra-
bland.html?smid=tw-bna&referer=https://t.co/3xXvrUWSmv. 
 67. Times Editorial Bd., Police Commission Must Stop Stonewalling Activists, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-police-
commission-chaos-20151005-story.html. 
 68. There is reason to believe that these movements are gaining political 
power. Anita Alvarez and Timothy McGinty, the Cook County and Cuyahoga 
County prosecutors who dragged their feet in prosecuting the police officers who 
killed Laquan McDonald and Tamir Rice, respectively, have since both been voted 
out of office, during elections dominated by opponents who vocalized disgust over 
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of misconduct by police officers, the primary mechanism for 
reviewing those claims is still, in most cities, to entrust them 
to internal affairs units within police departments. These 
units fall woefully short of fulfilling their duties to 
investigate, punish, and deter misconduct. 
II. THE FARCE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
In his book Between the World and Me, Ta-Nehisi Coates 
writes of a police officer in Prince Georges County, Maryland, 
who killed an unarmed black man: “[the] officer, given 
maximum power, bore minimum responsibility. He was 
charged with nothing. He was punished by no one. He was 
returned to his work.”69 The phenomenon Coates describes—
an armed officer who, having sworn to protect a community, 
instead shoots and kills one of its members without 
repercussion—is devastatingly familiar to many minorities.70 
The ability of officers to commit violent acts with impunity is 
due in no small part to internal review systems that routinely 
turn their backs to police misconduct. 
Internal review refers to the practice of relying on police 
officers—typically working in a unit known as Internal 
Affairs—to handle investigations into alleged misconduct by 
other officers within the same department.71 For most police 
  
the lack of governmental response to these shootings. See Claire Landsbaum, 
Prosecutor Anita Alvarez Loses Chicago Reelection in Wake of Laquan McDonald 
Controversy, NY MAG. (Mar. 16, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/
2016/03/chicago-prosecutor-anita-alvarez-ousted.html#; Jane Morice, The Nation 
Reacts to Ouster of Tamir Rice Prosecutor Timothy J. McGinty, CLEVELAND.COM 
(Mar. 16, 2016, 4:52 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/03/
the_nation_reacts_to_ouster_of.html. 
 69. TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 80 (2015). 
 70. For example, Richard Haste, the white New York Police Department officer 
who shot and killed seventeen-year-old Ramarley Graham, an unarmed African 
American teenager, has since been promoted and received $25,000 in pay 
increases in the four years since he killed Graham. NYPD Officer Who Shot 
Unarmed Ramarley Graham Received $25K in Raises, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Dec. 23, 
2015), http://www.democracynow.org/2015/12/23/headlines/nypd_officer_who_
shot_unarmed_ramarley_graham_received_25k_in_raises. 
 71. There are no national standards for internal affairs units, so each unit may 
operate differently. For readers entirely unfamiliar with the internal affairs 
review process and how it may work, I recommend two works: U.S. DEP’T OF 
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departments across the United States, internal affairs units 
review the majority of civilian complaints regarding officer 
misconduct.72 Allowing officers within the same police 
department to investigate each other presents a variety of 
problems throughout the entire complaint process, from 
intake to investigation to decision-making and discipline. 
Although the reports, surveys, and anecdotes discussed 
below are not exhaustive, they provide a taste of the pitfalls 
inherent—and existent—in internal review processes around 
the country. 
A. Police Departments Routinely Deter Citizens from 
Reporting Officer Misconduct 
The first step in the complaint process is, of course, 
making a complaint. Typically, police departments rely on an 
internal affairs unit to review those complaints, which means 
the citizen reporting the complaint must do so to another 
officer within the same police department as the officer about 
whom she is complaining. It should come as no surprise that 
such complaints are often met with skepticism or, worse, 
open hostility. After James Fields, a black man in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, filed a complaint alleging that 
police officers had falsely arrested him, he reported that a 
patrol car parked outside his house every night for a month, 
serving as a silent warning about the consequences of making 
such claims.73 When Randall Yorker, a father in Manalapan, 
  
JUSTICE, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FROM A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE, http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p164-
pub.pdf (providing guidelines for what should happen when a civilian files a 
complaint with an internal affairs unit); and Ryan J. Reilly, Here’s What Happens 
When You Complain to Cops About Cops, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/internal-affairs-police-
misconduct_us_5613ea2fe4b022a4ce5f87ce (discussing what actually does 
happen when a citizen tries to file a complaint with an internal affairs unit). 
 72. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS 
ABOUT POLICE USE OF FORCE 4 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
ccpuf.pdf. 
 73. See Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks 
of Driving While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html?smid=tw-
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New Jersey, went to the police department to report that his 
teenage son had been harassed by a police officer, the officer 
receiving the complaint called him a “negro,” rolled up the 
complaint, and stuffed it into his back pocket.74 In 
Connecticut, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
conducted a survey of Connecticut police departments—
using anonymous volunteers who asked police officers 
questions about the complaint-reporting process—and 
discovered “widespread resistance to accepting misconduct 
complaints.”75 Several police officers refused to answer any 
questions about the intake process, others declined to accept 
the complaint unless the complainant reported in person to 
the police station, and still others said that civilians simply 
could not complain about minor issues like an officer’s 
discourtesy.76 
Even when a police department’s resistance to receiving 
complaints does not manifest itself in overt hostility, it can 
take more subtle forms, such as imposing unnecessarily 
complicated requirements on civilians attempting to file 
complaints. The ACLU survey found that the majority of 
Connecticut police departments refused to accept anonymous 
complaints, third-party complaints, or complaints from 
minors unaccompanied by a parent or guardian.77 The 
Cleveland Department of Police had even stricter 
requirements, refusing to investigate unless the complainant 
both identified himself by name and signed the complaint.78 
Many police departments also require civilians to swear to 
the complaint under penalty of perjury, and threaten 
complainants with the possibility of prosecution for false 
  
nytnational&smtyp=cur&_r=0. The police department later rejected every one of 
the allegations in Fields’s complaint. Id.  
 74. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., THE CRISIS INSIDE POLICE INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS 5 (2009), https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/3013/1540/4573/060409IA2.pdf. 
 75. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF CONN., supra note 36, at 1. 
 76. Id. at 2, 5-6. 
 77. Id. at 6. 
 78. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 38-40. 
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statements.79 Other departments warn non-citizens that 
making a complaint exposes them to the possibility of 
deportation.80 All of these practices—preventing people from 
making complaints, or warning them about the possibility of 
dire consequences if they do—serve to deter people from 
making complaints, particularly the minorities and 
immigrants who are most likely to be victimized by police 
misconduct. 
B. Even When People File Complaints, Police Departments 
Frequently Fail to Investigate Them 
Civilians who endure the intake process and file a 
complaint have little assurance that it will ever be 
investigated. The DOJ has investigated police departments 
across the country for civil rights violations, and found 
repeated instances in which civilians’ complaints reported 
through an internal intake process were never investigated. 
When the DOJ investigated the Ferguson, Missouri Police 
Department in the wake of Michael Brown’s death at the 
hands of officer Darren Wilson, it found that Ferguson police 
officers “rarely respond meaningfully to civilian complaints 
of officer misconduct,” and such complaints had a “significant 
likelihood” of going uninvestigated.81 The Cleveland 
Department of Police, when asked in 2014 to produce final 
dispositions for civilian complaints filed within the last two 
years, was unable to do so; its files were so disorganized that 
it could not even say whether the complaints had been 
investigated.82 
Other police departments have investigation policies in 
place but do not follow them. Until very recently, the Newark, 
New Jersey Police Department had a policy that, when it 
received a civilian complaint of officer misconduct, the 
Internal Affairs Unit was required to investigate the 
allegation, document whatever investigative steps it took, 
  
 79. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF CONN., supra note 36, at 6, 8; AM. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., supra note 74, at 9. 
 80. See sources cited supra note 79. 
 81. FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 2, 83. 
 82. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 11. 
2016] THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS FARCE 857 
 
and record its ultimate findings.83 In practice, however, the 
unit simply did not follow this procedure and many 
complaints were not properly investigated.84 A DOJ 
investigation into the New Orleans Police Department 
revealed even more systemic problems. In addition to being 
so disorganized that it could not say whether certain 
complaints had ever been investigated, the New Orleans 
police failed to track any allegations regarding 
discriminatory policing and systematically excluded many 
serious misconduct claims from investigation altogether.85  
The DOJ is by no means the only agency to uncover 
evidence of woefully inadequate, or nonexistent, internal 
investigations. In Denver, the Office of the Independent 
Monitor found that, between 2011 and 2013, the Denver 
Sheriff’s Department’s Internal Affairs Bureau received fifty-
four complaints alleging serious misconduct by deputy 
sheriffs and investigated only nine.86 Of the nine 
investigations it did conduct, six occurred only after the 
Bureau initially ignored the complaints, and the 
complainants then filed separate grievances through an 
outside agency.87 Had those complainants not persisted after 
the Internal Affairs Bureau ignored them, it appears that the 
Bureau would not have investigated those six complaints 
  
 83. See NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 37. In January of 2015, 
Newark’s mayor announced the creation of a new civilian complaint review board 
designated to review many complaints of officer misconduct. See Mark Bonamo, 
Newark Mayor Baraka, Police Department Announce Creation of Civilian 
Complaint Review Board, POLITICKER N.J. (Jan. 20, 2015), 
http://politickernj.com/2015/01/newark-mayor-baraka-police-department-
announce-creation-of-civilian-complaint-review-board/. 
 84. See NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 38-39. 
 85. NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at xvii-xviii, 79-80, 83-84, 88. 
 86. OIR GROUP, REPORT ON THE USE OF FORCE & INTERNAL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS 




 87. DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, 2013 SEMIANNUAL REPORT 12 
(2013), https://www.denvergov.org/Portals/374/documents/Semiannual_Report_
Final_2013-12-02.pdf. 
858 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
either.88 Even after the Independent Monitor issued this 
report, the problem persisted: in 2015, the Independent 
Monitor identified another series of complaints that the 
Internal Affairs Bureau had received and classified as 
needing investigation but had not actually bothered to 
investigate.89 
Investigative inertia is also not limited to major cities 
with overwhelming caseloads. Evidence presented in a 
federal lawsuit revealed that the Internal Affairs Unit for the 
Camden, New Jersey Police Department had 128 pending 
allegations of excessive force by police officers over a one-year 
period and investigated only eleven.90 The next year, the 
Internal Affairs Unit had a backlog of 174 cases involving 
claims of excessive force, and investigated a mere six.91 In 
Newark, residents reported filing complaints with the 
Internal Affairs Unit and receiving little or no subsequent 
contact from investigators.92 When investigators did contact 
complainants, they routinely failed to follow up with the 
complainants to clarify facts critical to misconduct 
investigations.93 Internal affairs investigators in the 
Albuquerque Police Department also frequently failed to 
interview civilians who had identified themselves as 
witnesses to police officers’ use of force.94 A review of the 
Santa Maria, California Police Department revealed that the 
department had received numerous civilian complaints that 
it never looked into at all.95  
  
 88. See id. 
 89.  DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, 2015 SEMIANNUAL REPORT 32, 
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/374/documents/
OIM_2015_Semiannual_Report_FINAL.pdf. 
 90. Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208, 217 (D.N.J. 2015). 
 91. Id. 
 92.  NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 38. 
 93. Id. 
 94. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 29 (concluding that the 
internal affairs unit was “deficient in carrying out one of its most basic duties”). 
 95. MICHAEL GENNACO ET AL., OIR GROUP, REPORT TO THE CITY OF SANTA MARIA 
ON SANTA MARIA POLICE DEPARTMENT 17-19 (2014), http://oirgroup.com/
oirgroup.com/Reports_files/santa%20maria%20public%20report%20final.pdf. 
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C. When Investigations Do Happen, They Are Heavily 
Biased in Favor of the Officers Under Investigation 
Internal investigations are notoriously biased in favor of 
fellow officers. As Professor Chavis Simmons notes, 
“[p]erhaps the strongest criticism of internal police 
investigations is that the officers investigating these reports 
have an inherent inability to conduct impartial 
investigations.”96 This partiality manifests itself in a number 
of ways. As one example, internal affairs units often set 
impossibly stringent standards for sustaining civilian 
complaints. The Cleveland Internal Affairs Unit will sustain 
a complaint, and find that the officer violated policy, only if 
the allegations are proven beyond a reasonable doubt—the 
highest standard in American law, and one virtually never 
used for administrative review.97 During DOJ interviews 
with Internal Affairs Unit investigators, several officers 
admitted that their goal in investigations was to cast the 
accused officers in the best light possible.98 The DOJ report 
concluded that the Internal Affairs Unit’s “admitted bias 
appears deeply rooted” and “cuts at the heart of the 
accountability system” within the Cleveland Police 
Department.99  
The San Jose, California Police Department has a 
different method for all but guaranteeing that civilian 
complaints will ultimately fail. The San Jose police handle 
all allegations of racially-biased policing with a two-step 
procedure: (1) asking the accused officer if race was a factor 
in his interactions with the complainant; and (2) requiring 
the complainant to prove that the officer’s actions were 
motivated by race.100 Not surprisingly, the officers regularly 
deny that race was a factor in their actions, and the 
  
 96. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder 
Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 503 (2008). 
 97. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 5, 35. 
 98. Id. at 5. 
 99. Id.  
 100. CITY OF SAN JOSE, OFFICE OF THE INDEP. POLICE AUDITOR, 2014 IPA YEAR 
END REPORT 63, http://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/42029. 
860 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
complainants are unable to prove that the officers were 
motivated by racial bias. As of 2014, the San Jose Police 
Department had never once sustained a complaint of 
racially-biased policing.101 
In other internal affairs units, the standards used to 
assess a complaint are essentially irrelevant, because 
investigators ignore even the most obvious evidence of officer 
misconduct. In Newark, the Internal Affairs Unit sustained 
between four and seven percent of civilian complaints in the 
years spanning 2010 through 2012.102 Although the unit was 
aware that the police department had a serious theft 
problem—it had received multiple complaints from arrestees 
whose personal property was stolen during the arrest or 
booking process, and many of these arrestees had identified 
the same officers as responsible for the thefts—the Internal 
Affairs Unit did not sustain a single theft complaint against 
these officers.103 In a lawsuit filed against the City of Newark, 
an expert testified that, after evaluating civilian complaints 
and disciplinary records of accused officers, it was clear that 
the department had a pattern of “almost invariably 
reject[ing]” civilian complaints.104 The expert concluded that 
the Newark Police Department paid “little or no attention to 
complaints from citizens.”105 
After the Connecticut Attorney General’s office reviewed 
the Connecticut State Police internal affairs system, it 
reported that the review process was “so ineffective,” and the 
agency’s predilection to ignore or justify officer misconduct 
was “so strong,” that officers were virtually guaranteed to 
avoid discipline for even criminal behavior.106 Sometimes this 
  
 101. Id. at 9. 
 102. NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 35. 
 103. Id. at 31. 
 104. Garcia v. City of Newark, No. 08-1725 (SRC), 2011 WL 689616, at *4 
(D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2011). 
 105. Id. at *4. 
 106. N.Y. STATE POLICE & CONN. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON 
THE EVALUATION OF THE CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS PROGRAM, at ii, vi, 132 (2006), www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/other/conn_report_
12-04-06.pdf. 
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bias is the product of high-ranking officers seeking to protect 
their own reputation and department. Supervisors within the 
Connecticut State Police, for example, directed internal 
affairs investigators to ignore evidence, declined to follow up 
on investigative leads, and refused to open a case with strong 
evidence of misconduct unless the complaint could be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.107 As a result, the internal affairs 
unit failed to investigate serious allegations, and officers who 
otherwise may have faced disciplinary action as severe as 
termination or even arrest retained their jobs without any 
consequences.108  
D. Investigations Are Particularly Reproachable in the 
Context of Excessive Force Complaints 
Police officers’ use of excessive force is a frequent source 
of discord between police departments and the communities 
they serve.109 Use of force is such a significant problem—and 
has been for so many years—that even some law enforcement 
officials are starting to call for mandatory reporting of all 
uses of force by police officers.110 Unfortunately, even when 
police officers create those reports, they are typically 
reviewed pro forma if at all. When the DOJ investigated the 
Ferguson Police Department (FPD), it summarized the 
department’s policies for reviewing officers’ use of force as 
“particularly ineffectual,” noting that supervisors assigned to 
review uses of force “do little to no investigation; either do not 
understand or choose not to follow FPD’s use-of-force policy 
in analyzing officer conduct; rarely correct officer misconduct 
when they find it; and do not see the patterns of abuse that 
are evident when viewing these incidents in the aggregate.”111 
  
 107. Id. at iii, vi. 
 108. Id. at iii. 
 109. See Krogstad, supra note 52 (concluding that minorities are significantly 
less likely than whites to express confidence in the ability of the police to treat 
races equally and avoid excessive force).  
 110. See Charles A. Gruber & Wayne W. Schmidt, Mandatory Nationwide Use 
of Force Reporting by Police and Correctional Agencies—and Why This is an 
Important Issue, 6 AELE MO. L.J. 501, 504-06 (2015). 
 111. FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 38. 
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Even when the officers’ reports themselves made clear that 
they violated the department’s use of force policy—without 
even taking into account the civilians’ side of the story—those 
officers were virtually never disciplined. Out of 151 incidents 
in which officers used force on civilians, supervisors and 
command staff approved all but one.112 The Ferguson police 
chief himself admitted that he had never once overturned a 
supervisor’s conclusion that use of force was reasonable.113 
The DOJ report concluded that “uses of force that violate the 
law or FPD policy are rarely detected and often ignored when 
they are discovered.”114  
Police departments across the country rubberstamp their 
officers’ overuse of force against civilians. In Albuquerque, 
the DOJ found that police department supervisors very 
rarely scrutinized their officers’ use of force, and instead 
found obviously excessive force to be “reasonable, [or] even 
exemplary.”115 In New Orleans, police officers “routinely 
disregarded” department policies regarding use of force, 
supervisors failed to investigate uses of force, and incidents 
involving “clearly unjustified force” were nonetheless 
approved by supervisors all the way up the department’s 
chain of command.116 Similarly, though the DOJ’s review of 
officer-involved shootings within the New Orleans Police 
Department revealed “many” instances of “clear policy 
violations” over just a two-year period, the police department 
itself had not found an officer-involved shooting to violate 
policy in the last six years.117 The DOJ investigation 
concluded that New Orleans police regularly “used force, 
  
 112. Id. at 39. 
 113. Id. at 41. 
 114. Id. at 16; see also FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A 
PATH TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 27 (2015), http://3680or2khmk
3bzkp33juiea1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/101415_
FergusonCommissionReport.pdf (noting that civilians’ distrust of Ferguson police 
officers was “compounded by the perception that when force is used, 
investigations into the use of force incident will be biased toward the law 
enforcement officer”). 
 115.  ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 23. 
 116. NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at vii. 
 117. Id. at vi, 18. 
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including deadly force, in a manner that plainly contradicted 
… the Constitution” and endangered the lives of innocent 
civilians, but no one in the police department was held 
accountable.118  
The same is true in Cleveland, where police department 
supervisors failed to thoroughly investigate allegations of 
excessive force, and instead conducted cursory investigations 
that “almost never found the force to be unreasonable,” and 
were “designed from the outset to justify officers’ actions.”119 
Over a five-year span, the Newark, New Jersey Police 
Department did not discipline a single officer for using 
excessive force.120 And in Seattle, the police department 
received 1,230 use of force reports between 2009 and 2011, 
and referred only five for further investigation into the 
possibility of officer misconduct.121 An exposé of the review 
process there concluded that use of force reviews were little 
more than a formality, designed to automatically approve the 
officers’ decisions to use force.122  
Civilians’ complaints regarding use of force are equally 
ignored. Between 2001 and 2007, the Camden, New Jersey 
Police Department received 485 complaints regarding 
excessive force, and the Internal Affairs Unit sustained only 
two.123 The review process was so pointless that a federal 
district court concluded a jury could reasonably find the City 
of Camden had “a custom of performing inadequate 
investigations of citizen complaints of police 
  
 118. NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 3. According to the United 
States Supreme Court, force is unconstitutionally excessive if it goes beyond what 
is “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances” known to the 
officer. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). 
 119. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 31. 
 120. NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 42. 
 121. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
4, 12 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/spd_findletter_12-
16-11.pdf [hereinafter SEATTLE INVESTIGATION]. 
 122. Id. at 4, 19. 
 123. Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208, 217-18 (D.N.J. 2015). 
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brutality . . . which reflected an indifference to the allegedly 
excessive use of force by its officers.”124  
In Albuquerque, the Internal Affairs Unit identified less 
than one percent of officers’ use of force incidents as 
unreasonable, while the DOJ reviewed the same reports and 
concluded that fully one-third of the incidents involved 
unreasonable force.125 Even more disturbingly, Albuquerque 
police officers shot and killed twenty people between 2009 
and 2012, and the DOJ found that the “majority” of those 
shootings were unjustified, including multiple cases in which 
officers shot and killed civilians who did not pose an 
immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury.126 The 
DOJ concluded that the Albuquerque Police Department’s 
approval of nearly every use of force indicated “a pervasive 
and deliberate leniency in supervisory oversight and 
accountability.”127  
A federal district court reached the same conclusion 
regarding the Philadelphia Police Department. The family of 
Billy Panas, a man murdered by Philadelphia police officer 
Frank Tepper, sued the police department, alleging that it 
had intentionally ignored “deeply troubling” use of excessive 
force by Officer Tepper.128 The lawsuit alleged that Officer 
Tepper had pistol-whipped a citizen, physically attacked 
young boys who threw snowballs at his house, and lied about 
the incidents to the internal affairs officers.129 Although the 
internal affairs investigators made note of Tepper’s volatility 
on multiple occasions, and also expressed doubt that he was 
telling the truth about the incidents, they recommended no 
discipline, and the police department continued to give him 
positive reviews.130 The district court held that a jury could 
reasonably find that Panas’s death was foreseeable, given 
Officer Tepper’s history of excessive force, and that the police 
  
 124. Id. at 224. 
 125. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 16. 
 126. Id. at 2-3. 
 127. Id. at 16; see also id. at 24. 
 128. Panas v. City of Philadelphia, 871 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
 129. Id. at 372-73. 
 130. Id. at 372-74. 
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department could have prevented Panas’s death by 
disciplining or firing Tepper.131 
The farcical nature of internal police review is perhaps 
most tellingly illustrated by police departments that allow 
supervisors to “investigate” and approve their own use of 
force.132 Both the New Orleans and Albuquerque police 
departments, for example, have allowed supervisors who 
personally used force against civilians to lead the 
investigation into and review complaints regarding their own 
use of force.133 Until recently, the Santa Maria Police 
Department allowed the same officers who were accused of 
using force against arrestees to then interview the arrestees 
about those incidents.134 And in multiple officer-involved 
shooting investigations in the Albuquerque Police 
Department, other officers who were involved in the incident 
were allowed to participate in the shooting officer’s interview, 
which encourages collaboration in recounting how the 
incident occurred.135 This practice—allowing the very people 
who have been accused of using force to determine whether 
that force was reasonable—brings to mind an old African 
proverb: “Corn can’t expect justice from a court composed of 
chickens.”136 A civilian complaining about an officer’s 
misconduct cannot expect justice to emanate from the very 
officer he accused. 
  
 131. Id. at 379. 
 132. See FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 40. 
 133. NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 17-18; ALBUQUERQUE 
INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 33-34. 
 134. Michael Gennaco et al., supra note 95, at 7. 
 135. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 28. 
 136. The first person to coin this proverb is unknown, but it is most commonly 
used in Nigeria. Roof Garden Wall—Right Center Panel, HARVARD LAW SCH. LIBR.: 
WORDS OF JUST., http://library.law.harvard.edu/justicequotes/explore-the-
room/south-3 (last visited May 27, 2016). A similar proverb, attributed to an 
anonymous Ghanaian, is: “The chicken is never declared innocent in the court of 
hawks.” Id. 
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E. Internal Affairs Units Routinely Resist Requiring 
Serious Discipline for Serious Misconduct 
Police departments’ resistance to disciplining their own 
officers extends to even the most obvious misconduct. A 
report on the Portland, Oregon Police Department found that 
the Internal Affairs Division sustained “very few” civilian 
complaints of any sort, and filing complaints against 
miscreant officers was futile because the department would 
simply not discipline them.137 One of the most disturbing 
revelations to come out of the Ferguson investigation was 
evidence that Ferguson police officers sent numerous racially 
discriminatory emails to each other, stereotyping minorities 
as lazy, unemployed, living off welfare, and prone to 
committing crimes.138 Not one of the officers receiving these 
emails ever reported them as inappropriate, and many 
forwarded them on to other people.139  
The Seattle Police Department has also had a number of 
incidents in which police officers used racial slurs against 
minorities, including one in which an officer was recorded 
threatening to “beat the f’ing Mexican piss out of a suspect.”140 
Although multiple officers at the scene witnessed this 
incident, none reported it, and the police department did not 
discipline the officer until a civilian bystander made public a 
video of the incident.141 On other occasions, Seattle police 
officers reportedly called a Native American man a “f’ing 
Indian,” and derisively suggested that a black man who 
worked at a hospital must be “the janitor.”142 Despite 
complaints by civilians who overheard the incidents, the 
police department declined to discipline these officers.143  
  
 137. EILEEN LUNA-FIREBAUGH, PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF THE INDEPENDENT 
POLICE REVIEW DIVISION 63 (2008), http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.
cfm?a=245276&c=44653. 
 138. See FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 71-72. 
 139. Id. at 72.  
 140. SEATTLE INVESTIGATION, supra note 121, at 27. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 28. 
 143. Id. at 27-28. 
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Police departments are also unwilling to refer cases 
involving their own officers’ misconduct to the local 
prosecutor’s office for potential criminal charges. The DOJ 
investigation into the Newark Police Department revealed 
“multiple instances in which credible complaints of 
potentially criminal uses of force were not referred to 
prosecutors for review, even though by any objective measure 
they should have been,” and concluded that the department 
“often fails” to refer use of force cases to the prosecutor’s 
office.144 Similarly, the DOJ report regarding the New 
Orleans Police Department concluded that criminal 
misconduct by officers was inadequately investigated and too 
rarely prosecuted.145 The police department also offered its 
investigators no guidance on when or how to contact a 
prosecutor when an investigation revealed criminal conduct; 
in practice that meant that the investigators declined to 
contact the prosecutor at all.146 One possible explanation for 
this extreme reluctance to refer officers for prosecution is the 
political firestorm that can result: few police chiefs, many of 
whom are elected officials, are willing to endure the 
groundswell of criticism that results within and outside the 
police department’s ranks when the department admits one 
of its officers engaged in criminal conduct.147 
Nearly twenty years ago in the landmark civil rights 
lawsuit Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals lamented the inadequacies of internal review, 
mourning that it was:  
not enough that an investigative process be in place . . . [t]he 
investigative process must be real. It must have some teeth. It must 
answer to the citizen by providing at least a rudimentary chance of 
  
 144. NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 25, 28. 
 145. NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at xvii-xviii. 
 146. Id. at 94. 
 147. Compare, The Times Editorial Board, Chief Beck’s Call For Prosecution, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-lapd-
shooting-20160111-story.html, with Los Angeles Police Protective League, Why 
Chief Beck Failed Us, POLICE MAG. (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.police
mag.com/blog/patrol-tactics/story/2016/01/why-chief-beck-failed-us.aspx (taking 
contrasting viewpoints on LAPD Chief Beck’s decision to recommend criminal 
charges in LAPD officer’s shooting of Brendon Glenn, an unarmed black man). 
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redress when injustice is done. The mere fact of investigation for 
the sake of investigation does not fulfill a city’s obligation to its 
citizens.148 
Those words ring equally true today. For too many internal 
affairs units, the investigative process is nugatory and 
toothless. It makes a mockery of the complaint process by 
masquerading as a means of redress while perpetuating 
injustice.  
III. THE FLAWS OF EXISTING INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
Independent review agencies are not a new creation: they 
first cropped up during the Civil Rights movement of the 
1950s and 1960s, after activists, mostly from African 
American communities, began demanding that outside 
agencies investigate the blatant abuses police officers were 
inflicting on black communities.149 The most basic premise of 
independent review—also referred to as civilian oversight—
is simply that someone other than a police officer is 
responsible for reviewing complaints alleging police 
misconduct.150 
Independent review agencies exist in many forms.151 
Some act as in-house additions to the review process; in this 
model, civilian employees serve alongside the internal affairs 
unit within a police department. Other independent review 
models are strictly external, conducting independent 
investigations of police misconduct allegations, and typically 
  
 148. Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 974 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Merman 
v. City of Camden, 824 F. Supp. 2d 581 (D.N.J. 2010) (detailing citizen complaints 
of a pattern of excess force by Camden, New Jersey police officers, and finding a 
question of fact over whether the Camden Police Department has a pattern and 
practice of allowing such force). 
 149. Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police 
Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. 
L.J. 479, 498-99 (2009). 
 150. See, e.g., Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded 
Role for Civilian Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 593 (1997). 
 151. For a more thorough discussion about the varieties of civilian oversight, see 
generally, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CIVILIAN 
OVERSIGHT (2001); Samuel Walker, Alternative Models of Citizen Oversight, in 
CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 11 (Justina Cintón Perino ed., 2006). 
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recommending discipline if the situation warrants. A third 
common form of independent review is the auditor model, in 
which designated civilian auditors review the decisions of 
internal affairs units after investigations have concluded, 
and make recommendations for improvements in future 
investigations.152   
Although independent review agencies take many forms, 
a shared characteristic of nearly all is that they have not done 
enough to reduce police misconduct. Even proponents of 
independent review agencies admit that they are often 
“‘weak, ineffective, poorly led,’ and have had no measurable 
impact on police misconduct.”153 The shortcomings of one 
prominent independent review agency—New York’s Civilian 
Complaint Review Board—were recently highlighted after a 
widely-publicized incident in which Officer James Frascatore 
of the New York Police Department tackled and handcuffed 
tennis star James Blake, a biracial man whom Frascatore 
allegedly mistook for an identity theft suspect.154 Blake, who 
unlike most victims of police misconduct enjoys sufficient 
celebrity to attract media attention to his plight, immediately 
took to the press to denounce Officer Frascatore’s unjustified 
use of force.155 A subsequent investigation revealed that at 
least three other black men had filed complaints against 
Officer Frascatore between 2012 and 2013, alleging that he 
had assaulted and physically attacked them without 
provocation, punched one man repeatedly in the face, 
knocked another man to the ground, and used racial slurs in 
  
 152. The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement 
Agencies (NACOLE) has an extensive list of and links to civilian oversight 
agencies in the United States. See Police Oversight by Jurisdiction (USA), NAT’L 
ASS’N FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, http://www.nacole.org/
police_oversight_by_jurisdiction_usa (last visited May 26, 2016). 
 153. Simmons, supra note 96, at 504 (citation omitted). 
 154. See Benjamin Mueller & Nate Schweber, Officer Who Arrested James Blake 




 155. Id. 
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at least one of the attacks.156 Although all of these complaints 
had been reported to the Civilian Complaint Review Board, 
they had not resulted in any discipline for Officer 
Frascatore.157 
New York’s Civilian Complaint Review Board is hardly 
the only independent review agency that has been on the 
receiving end of extensive, and deserving, criticism. A 2008 
review of the Portland Independent Police Review reported 
that only twenty to thirty percent of surveyed citizens were 
satisfied with the agency, and concluded that the agency 
“does not have the confidence of the community.”158 In 2015, 
Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority came under 
scathing criticism for hiring a controversial psychologist, best 
known for testifying in favor of police officers in shooting 
cases, to train its investigators.159 Independent review 
agencies struggle from a number of deficiencies in both 
staffing and structure, including understaffing, overly cozy 
relationships with police departments (or, conversely, poor 
cooperation from police departments), insufficient authority, 
and unwillingness to take politically unpopular positions.  
  
 156. Id.; Associated Press, Officer Who Arrested James Blake Has Two Civil 
Rights Suits Against Him, ESPN (Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.espn.com/
espnw/news-commentary/article/13630856/officer-james-blake-arrest-history-
excessive-force-allegations; Daniel Beekman, Queens Man Sues Over Bogus 
Arrest That Began with NYPD Cops Pepper-spraying Him Repeatedly—While on 
Video, NY DAILY NEWS (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/queens/queens-man-sues-pepper-spray-abuse-cops-article-1.1755374; Ben 
Brumfield, Before Tackling James Blake, Police Officer Had Complaints of 
Brutality, CNN (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/14/us/james-blake-
tackled-officer. 
 157. Id. The Civilian Complaint Review Board has since sustained a finding 
against Officer Frascatore for misconduct in his arrest of Blake, and 
recommended discipline of either suspension or termination. See J. David 
Goodman, Officer in James Blake Arrest Used Excessive Force, Panel Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/nyregion/officer-in-
james-blake-arrest-used-excessive-force-panel-says.html?_r=0. 
 158. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 137, at 9. 
 159. See, e.g., Chip Mitchell, City Sends Police-Shooting Investigators to Trainer 
Accused of Pro-Cop Bias, WBEZ NEWS (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.wbez.org/
news/city-sends-police-shooting-investigators-trainer-accused-pro-cop-bias-
113077.  
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A. Many Independent Review Agencies Are Inadequately 
Staffed So That Meaningful Investigations Are Virtually 
Impossible 
Some independent review agencies are staffed entirely by 
volunteers, many of whom have very limited review powers. 
Baltimore, for example, occasionally convenes an 
Independent Review Board in response to specific incidents, 
such as a 2011 shooting in which police officers killed an off-
duty officer and a civilian, and the 2013 death of Tyrone 
West, an African American man whom the police were 
restraining at the time he died.160 The board relies entirely on 
volunteers serving on a part-time basis, and receives no 
funding from the city.161 In contrast, the city of Tampa, 
Florida has a permanent review board, but it is also staffed 
entirely by volunteer members who review only “completed 
disciplinary cases” rather than ongoing investigations, and 
make only recommendations to the police chief for 
improvement in future cases.162 Although the two boards are 
structured differently, both struggle to create any real 
change: their members are limited in both their opportunity 
to investigate in a prompt manner, and their ability to 
influence police departments and government officials. 
Understaffing often prevents timely responses to 
misconduct complaints, even in cities with independent 
review agencies run by full-time, paid employees. In New 
  
 160. BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT, INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD FOLLOW-UP 
RESPONSE 1 (2012), http://www.baltimorepolice.org/sites/default/files/IRB_BPD_
Final_v2.pdf [hereinafter FOLLOW-UP RESPONSE]; IN-CUSTODY FATALITY INDEP. 
REVIEW BD. FOR THE DEATH OF TYRONE WEST, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-
2 (2014), http://www.wbaltv.com/blob/view/-/27381810/data/1/-/wnk60uz/-
/Tyrone-West-death-police-report.pdf [hereinafter DEATH OF TYRONE WEST]. 
 161. DEATH OF TYRONE WEST, supra note 160, at 1-2. Baltimore also has a more 
permanent Civilian Review Board tasked with processing and investigating 
complaints regarding abusive language, harassment, or excessive force by police 
officers. See Civilian Review Board, General Rules, CITY OF BALTIMORE, 
http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/Government/BoardsandCommissions/OfficeofCi
vilRightsandWageEnforcement/CivilianReviewBoard/Rules.aspx (last visited 
May 26, 2016). 
 162. Citizens Review Board, CITY OF TAMPA, http://www.tampagov.net/city-
clerk/citizens-review-board (last visited May 26, 2016).  
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York City, the Citizen Complaint Review Board’s docket is 
unmanageably large compared to the number of 
investigators; the Review Board has historically taken nearly 
a year to resolve the average citizen complaint, and 
significantly longer on the rare occasions it sustains a 
complaint.163 A startlingly high percentage of independent 
review agencies also do not have their own investigators and 
are forced to rely on internal affairs officers to handle the 
investigations into all alleged misconduct. Scripps News 
recently surveyed more than 200 civilian oversight agencies 
across the United States, and nearly two-thirds reported that 
they do not have their own investigators.164 
B. Some Independent Review Agencies Are Inherently 
Biased in Favor of the Police 
Independent review agencies are often staffed by former 
police officers, prosecutors, or members of the law 
enforcement community, on the theory that these people 
have the greatest expertise in assessing whether a police 
officer’s actions were appropriate. Unfortunately, this 
composition presents a dilemma similar to that inherent in 
internal review: the people reviewing the police often have a 
closer relationship with the police department than with the 
civilian community they are intended to serve.  
This problem is prevalent in many independent review 
agencies. As noted above, Chicago’s Independent Police 
Review Authority, which is staffed primarily by former law 
enforcement officers, recently came under fire for hiring a 
psychologist—known primarily for his unwavering defense of 
police officers who shoot civilians—to train its 
investigators.165 One of the investigators was quoted as 
saying that the psychologist’s training gave him “a better 
  
 163. NYC CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., ANNUAL REPORT, at ix-x, 1 (2014), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/2014-annual-report-rev2layout.pdf. 
 164. Ross Jones, Many Civilian Review Groups Have Limited Power to Resolve 
Allegations of Police Misconduct, SCRIPPS NEWS (Nov. 16, 2015, 11:14 AM), 
http://www.wptv.com/news/national/many-civilian-review-groups-lack-the-
power-to-resolve-allegations-of-police-misconduct. 
 165. Mitchell, supra note 159. 
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way to articulate why the [police] shootings are almost 
always justified.”166 The former chief of the Independent 
Police Review Authority, who resigned in December of 2015 
after the Laquan McDonald shooting scandal, also fired one 
of the agency’s investigators, an African American man who 
had determined that several Chicago police shootings were 
unjustified and refused agency pressure to change his 
findings.167 As of 2015, the Independent Police Review 
Authority had investigated nearly 400 officer-involved 
shootings, and found only one to be unjustified.168  
Concerns over biased review agencies extend across the 
country. Los Angeles terminated its contract with the Office 
of Independent Review—a civilian oversight group that 
monitored investigations of alleged misconduct in the Los 
Angeles Sheriff’s Department—in 2014, amidst allegations 
that the review office was too closely partnered with the 
Sheriff’s Department, and concerns over the office’s ability to 
provide effective oversight.169 The Office of Independent 
Review was housed within the Sheriff’s Department and 
served in many ways as an advisory counsel to the Sheriff, 
rather than an oversight body.170 Similarly, the DOJ 
investigation into the Albuquerque Police Department 
concluded that, although the City had retained an 
independent review officer to investigate allegations of police 
misconduct, the review officer was essentially useless 
because she aligned herself more closely with the department 
than the civilians whose complaints she was hired to 
  
 166. Id. 
 167. Chip Mitchell, City Fires Investigator Who Found Cops at Fault in 
Shooting, WBEZ (July 20, 2015), http://www.wbez.org/news/city-fires-
investigator-who-found-cops-fault-shootings-112423. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Office of Independent Review, L.A. CTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 
http://shq.lasdnews.net/shq/LASD_Oversight/oversight_documents.html (last 
visited May 26, 2016); see also, e.g., Christina Villacorte, Inspector General: End 
L.A. County Contracts with Office of Independent Review, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 
18, 2014, 8:05 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/government-and-politics/2014
0318/inspector-general-end-la-county-contracts-with-office-of-independent-
review-special-counsel-merrick-bobb.  
 170. Villacorte, supra note 169. 
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investigate.171 The review officer had failed to acknowledge 
when departmental policy violations likely occurred, 
interpreted the police department’s policies in ways contrary 
to the policies’ language, and been “too forgiving of the 
department’s use of deadly force.”172 
Seattle’s Office of Professional Affairs, which is part of 
the Seattle Police Department but has a civilian director, has 
also been criticized for frequently deferring to the police 
department’s judgment concerning when and how to 
investigate allegations of officer misconduct.173 Although the 
Office of Professional Affairs is intended to serve as an 
impartial investigative body, it for years disposed of most 
citizen complaints by sending them to Seattle police precincts 
for internal review, even when the complaints involved 
serious allegations like excessive force or discriminatory 
policing.174 The quality of these investigations was, according 
to one Office of Professional Affairs staff member, 
“appalling.”175 Similarly, although Cleveland has a civilian 
Police Review Board that can be called in to review police 
misconduct, the board typically gets involved only after the 
internal police investigation has already been completed.176 
The Board relies almost exclusively on the police 
department’s findings; although it has subpoena power and 
is authorized to compel the police department to disclose 
investigative information, it rarely does so.177 As a result of 
the Review Board’s lackadaisical approach to investigation, 
the DOJ concluded in 2014 that the Review Board played 
virtually no meaningful role in investigation.178 
  
 171. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 39. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See SEATTLE INVESTIGATION, supra note 121, at 5, 7-8. 
 174. Id. at 5. 
 175. Id. 
 176. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 41-42. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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C. On the Other Extreme, Some Independent Review 
Agencies Have Hostile Relationships with the Police and 
No Authority to Demand Access to Police Officers or 
Files 
Although independent review agencies comprised 
primarily of former law enforcement officials pose a serious 
risk of bias in favor of the police, others suffer from the 
opposite problem: police departments that are overtly hostile 
and actively stymie the review agencies’ efforts to investigate 
misconduct allegations. For example, although the 
Philadelphia Police Advisory Commission exists to provide 
independent civilian oversight of police operations, the 
Philadelphia Police Department often refuses to disclose 
investigative files or complaints, and the Commission cannot 
access information critical to its investigations.179 In 
Washington, D.C., the Office of Police Complaints—the 
civilian oversight agency tasked with investigating police 
misconduct—reported that more than one-third of the police 
officers it investigated refused to cooperate with 
investigators, and the review agency could not require them 
to do so.180 
Hostility from the police could be overcome if the review 
agency was able to demand access to necessary police files or 
witnesses, but that is often not the case. Many independent 
review agencies lack even subpoena power, and cannot 
require police departments to provide information necessary 
to review claims.181 Additionally, about one-half of states 
  
 179. GEORGE FACHNER & STEVEN CARTER, COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF DEADLY FORCE IN THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT 119 
(2015), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0753-pub.pdf. 
 180. GOV’T OF D.C., POLICE COMPLAINTS BD., OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS: 
ANNUAL REPORT 24-25 (2012), https://assets.document
cloud.org/documents/608268/office-of-police-complaints-annual-report.pdf; see 
also Peter Hermann, D.C. Civilian Police Oversight Board Concerned As Lanier 
Overrules Decisions, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/dc-civilian-police-oversight-board-concerned-as-lanier-overrules-
decisions/2013/02/27/34e55944-800c-11e2-8074-b26a871b165a_story.html. 
 181. DEATH OF TYRONE WEST, supra note 160, at 1; FOLLOW-UP RESPONSE, supra 
note 160, at 1; David Porter, Newark OKs Strong Police Review Board; Union 
Vows Fight, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 16, 2016, 8:43 PM), 
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across the United States, as well as many cities, have laws 
that heavily favor police officers against those seeking 
information about the officers, and prevent disclosure of 
disciplinary records or complaints filed against those officers 
except in rare circumstances.182 Although some review 
agencies are specifically exempted from these privacy laws, 
others are forced to rely only on what sparse records the 
police departments consent to disclose. 
Other review agencies may not even know what 
complaints are being reported, because the review agency 
itself is not the designated recipient of all civilian complaints. 
In Seattle, for example, the Office of Professional Authority 
tracks complaints that civilians make directly to its office, 
but has no ability to track complaints made to individual 
police officers, police precincts, or the City itself. The Seattle 
Police Department has for years routinely failed to refer 
civilian complaints to the Office of Professional Authority, 
which results in a civilian oversight agency unable to 
investigate even serious complaints like excessive force.183 
And over a two-year period from 2011 to 2013, the Denver 
Sheriff’s Department notified the Office of the Independent 
Monitor about only nineteen percent of serious grievances 




 182. For a few examples of these laws, see, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §50-A 
(McKinney 2016) (preventing disclosure of police records except by court order); 
AURORA, COLO., MUN. CODE § 50-41 (placing strict limitations on disclosure of 
police records even when deemed relevant to criminal proceedings); Copley Press, 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 141 P.3d 288 (Cal. 2006) (holding that police personnel 
records are confidential under state law); Md. Dep’t of State Police v. Dashiell, 
117 A.3d 1 (Md. 2015) (holding that internal affairs investigatory records are 
exempt from disclosure); see also Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: 
Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the 
Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743 (2015) (discussing how various state and 
city laws hamper disclosure of police personnel records in criminal cases); David 
Packman, Police Misconduct Disclosure Laws, CATO INSTITUTE (Feb. 7, 2010), 
http://www.policemisconduct.net/police-misconduct-disclosure-laws/ (providing 
summary of police misconduct disclosure laws in all fifty states).  
 183. SEATTLE INVESTIGATION, supra note 121, at app. D2. 
 184. DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra, note 87 at 19. 
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even told about eighty-one percent of the most serious 
grievances, it had no way of investigating those complaints.  
D. A Large Percentage of Complaints That Independent 
Review Agencies Receive Are Never Meaningfully 
Resolved 
A startlingly low percentage of complaints made to 
independent review agencies are ever resolved with a finding 
that the alleged misconduct did or did not occur. The problem 
arises in part because of the unnecessary obstacles imposed 
on civilians attempting to report misconduct, which result in 
a high percentage of complaints being turned away at the 
proverbial (or actual) door. Albuquerque’s Police Review 
Commission, for example, is required by ordinance to reject 
a complaint unless it is personally signed by the complainant, 
nor can it accept a complaint that is reported more than 
ninety days after the alleged misconduct.185 As a result, a 
large number of complaints are rejected without even a 
cursory investigation. In Chicago, the Independent Police 
Review Authority requires a signed, sworn affidavit from 
almost every complainant, and will not move forward with 
the investigation unless it receives that affidavit.186 In 2012, 
the Independent Police Review Authority and the Chicago 
Police Department’s Board of Internal Affairs collectively 
closed more than forty percent of all complaints simply 
because they did not obtain the requisite affidavit.187  
When agencies do investigate complaints, the 
investigations still may not result in any meaningful 
  
 185. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 38-39. 
 186. RON SAFER ET AL., PREVENTING AND DISCIPLINING POLICE MISCONDUCT: AN 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CHICAGO’S POLICE 
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM 13 n.3, (2014), http://www.cityofchicago.org/
content/dam/city/progs/safety/Preventing_Disciplining_Police_Misconduct_Dec_
2014.pdf; File a Complaint, INDEP. POLICE REVIEW AUTHORITY, http://iprachicago.
org/howtofile.html (last visited May 26, 2016) (“State law requires that any person 
making an allegation of misconduct against a Chicago police officer sign a sworn 
affidavit that certifies that the allegation is true and correct.”).  
 187. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 48; see also GORDON WALDRON, PROCESSING 
COMPLAINTS AGAINST CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS 4 tbl.3 (2015) (source on file with 
the author). 
878 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
resolution. In 2014, New York City’s Citizen Complaint 
Review Board closed out nearly one-half of its cases with a 
finding of “unsubstantiated,” which means that the Board did 
not determine whether the complaint had merit or not.188 In 
the same year, Chicago’s Independent Police Review 
Authority closed out fifty-four percent of its investigations as 
“not sustained,” meaning that the agency decided it did not 
have sufficient evidence to determine whether the complaint 
was true or false.189 Between 2008 and 2012, the agency 
closed out seventy-one percent of its cases with a “not 
sustained” finding.190 Because most agencies are not required 
to report the reasons behind their findings, it is impossible to 
say exactly why these numbers are so high. But when a 
complaint is not sustained, no one is vindicated: not the 
officer accused, not the civilian who filed the complaint, and 
not the community hoping for a reason to believe that the 
review process actually works. 
Yet another factor contributing to extreme delays in 
resolving—or simply inability to resolve—citizen complaints 
is that the independent review agency is sometimes just one 
of several agencies involved in the review process. In 
Chicago, the Independent Police Review Authority processes 
the initial intake of all complaints, but depending on the type 
of misconduct alleged, it is just one of three agencies that may 
be involved in the review process.191 Misconduct 
investigations often drag on for years, and if the Review 
Authority eventually does recommend discipline, it takes 
even longer to implement because of the myriad of grievance 
and appeals opportunities available to the officers.192 Such 
extreme delays in resolving complaints may cause citizens to 
  
 188. N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2014), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/2014-annual-report-rev2layout.pdf. 
 189. WALDRON, supra note 187, at 5, tbl. 5. 
 190. Id. at 10. As low as these numbers may seem, they are a significant 
improvement over the absolutely abysmal rate of sustained investigations before 
the Independent Police Review Authority was established. For a statistical 
analysis of these stunningly low rates, see Craig B. Futterman et al., The Use of 
Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and Disciplinary Practices: The 
Chicago Police Department’s Broken System, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 251, 267 
tbl.1 (2008). 
 191. See SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 1. 
 192. Id. at 7. 
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believe that the agency is ineffectual, or worse, simply 
ignoring their complaints.  
E. Independent Review Agencies Almost Universally Lack 
Authority to Impose Discipline  
Perhaps the most common complaint about independent 
review agencies is that they lack the authority to create 
meaningful change. Sometimes this stems from the agency’s 
inability to investigate certain types of claims: for example, 
despite complaints that New York Police Department officers 
have a long history of making false statements in police 
reports or to investigative bodies, the Citizen Complaint 
Review Board is not authorized to investigate false statement 
cases; complaints about false statements are automatically 
referred to the Internal Affairs Unit.193  
More typically, however, the problem is that independent 
review agencies are—with very few exceptions—not 
authorized to require or impose discipline. Some agencies, 
like the Cleveland Police Review Board, play no role 
whatsoever in the disciplinary process.194 But most simply 
have the ability to recommend discipline, which the police 
chief is then free to accept or reject. The setup in St. Louis 
County, Missouri, is typical of this approach; there, a civilian 
Board of Police Commissioners reviews certain types of 
misconduct allegations and makes recommendations on 
discipline, but the chief of police remains the final authority 
on whether to impose that discipline.195 New York City’s 
Civilian Complaint Review Board also does not have any 
disciplinary authority; instead, it simply forwards its 
findings to the police commissioner, who frequently 
  
 193. N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., supra note 188, at x-xi, 39-45. 
 194. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 41. 
 195. BLAKE NORTON ET AL., COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT 98 (2015), http://ric-zai-
inc.com/Publications/cops-p316-pub.pdf. Another example of this approach is the 
Albuquerque civilian oversight structure, where the Police Oversight Commission 
makes recommendations on both misconduct findings and discipline, but the 
police chief retains complete discretion over the ultimate decision of whether 
misconduct occurred and, if so, what discipline is appropriate. See ALBUQUERQUE 
INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 38. 
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disregards the Review Board’s recommendations.196 As of 
2014, the Civilian Complaint Review Board reported that the 
Police Department had declined to impose any discipline in 
fully one-quarter of cases in which the Review Board found 
misconduct and recommended discipline.197 
Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority in theory 
has more power to enforce discipline, but in practice serves 
mostly as an example of bureaucracy getting in the way of 
real change. When the Independent Police Review Authority 
sustains a finding of misconduct against a police officer, it 
recommends discipline to the superintendent of police.198 The 
recommended discipline goes through an extensive review 
process within the police department, during which 
supervisors in the accused officer’s chain of command have 
an opportunity to concur or disagree with the recommended 
discipline before the case is passed on to the 
superintendent.199 The superintendent then has ninety days 
to respond.200 If the superintendent disagrees with the 
Review Authority’s recommendation, the case is referred to a 
separate three-person Police Board, which reviews the case 
and decides whether the superintendent is justified in 
departing from the Review Authority’s recommendation.201 
Even the Police Board’s decision is not final and can be 
overridden if the officer chooses to appeal.202 In 2012, the 
average complaint filed with the Review Authority took 
nearly three years to reach a final disposition because so 
  
 196. See N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., supra note 188, at 6; N.Y.C. 
Civilian Complaint Review Bd., About CCRB, CITY OF NEW YORK, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/about/about.shtml (last visited May 26, 2016); 
N.Y.C. Civilian Complaint Review Bd., APU and Police Discipline, CITY OF NEW 
YORK, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/police/police.shtml (last visited May 26, 
2016). 
 197. N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., supra note 188, at 6. 
 198. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 14. 
 199. Id. See also WALDRON, supra note 187, at 8. 
 200. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 14. 
 201. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-57-60 (2007); SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 
14; WALDRON, supra note 187, at 8.  
 202. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 15. 
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many agencies are involved in the review process and officers 
have so many options for appeal.203  
F. When Independent Review Agencies Do Recommend 
Discipline, It Is Typically Very Minor 
Even on the relatively rare occasions that an 
independent review agency sustains a misconduct complaint 
and recommends discipline, the discipline is often so 
negligible that it stands little chance of operating as an 
impetus for change. When Chicago’s Independent Review 
Authority recently found that numerous police officers had 
racially discriminated against civilians—by using words the 
agency euphemistically described as “racially biased 
language,” “racial comments,” “racially offensive comments,” 
and “ethnically biased language”—the Review Authority 
recommended minor suspensions of no more than a few days 
for each officer.204 It is difficult to envision another 
professional setting in which an employee would be allowed 
to use racial slurs against a customer and even retain his 
job,205 let alone escape with a brief suspension and no other 
discipline. Yet in policing, a profession which already 
shoulders the shame of decades of discrimination against 
  
 203. Id. at 15-16. 
 204. See CITY OF CHI. INDEP. POLICE REVIEW AUTH., QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1, 
2015–JUNE 30, 2015, at Abstracts of Sustained Cases C.R. Nos. 1052025, 1050270, 
1060197, 1068340, 1066452, http://www.iprachicago.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/07/2015-07-15QuarterlyReport.pdf. The report does not provide any specific 
descriptions of the racially offensive language that the officers used. Id. 
 205. See, e.g., Eric B. Meyer, Intern Fired for Racist Tweet, EMPLOYER 
HANDBOOK (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.theemployerhandbook.com/2015/10/
intern-fired-for-using-racial-slur-on-twitter-keeps-digging-the-hole-deeper.html; 
Oregon Man Fired After Yelling Hispanic Slurs . . . at Arab Woman, RT QUESTION 
MORE (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.rt.com/usa/328327-oregon-man-racial-slurs-
video (describing the story of a plumber in Oregon who was fired after yelling 
racial slurs at an Arab woman); Khushbu Shah, Wendy’s Employees Fired for 
Leaving Racist Note in 7-Year-Old’s Meal, EATER (Oct. 16, 2015), 
http://www.eater.com/2015/10/16/9552435/two-wendys-employees-fired-racist-
note-kids-meal-colorado (describing how a Wendy’s employee was fired for using 
a racial slur with a customer). 
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racial minorities,206 the response to openly biased officers is 
still little more than a gentle chiding. 
Vague suggestions about possible discipline are as 
ineffectual as inadequate discipline. In 2013, Denver’s Office 
of the Independent Monitor issued a report finding that, over 
the past two years, almost one in six complaints that inmates 
had filed against the Denver Sheriff’s Department involved 
just four deputies, from a staff of over 700 officers.207 In the 
face of this startling statistic, the Independent Monitor made 
only one recommendation: that “these officers, or the jail 
areas to which they are assigned, may require more active 
supervision by jail administrators.”208 When less than 0.6 
percent of the department’s officers are responsible for more 
than 15 percent of misconduct complaints, that should 
trigger a response more forceful than a recommendation for 
“more active supervision.”209 Independent review agencies 
serve little purpose if they do not have the courage or 
authority to make more than mealy-mouthed 
recommendations in response to major problems.  
IV. THE FIX: ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE REVIEW AGENCY 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights released a report on the status 
of police reform in the United States, commenting that 
complaints of police misconduct “seem to be incessant, and 
they typically prompt a complex series of responses: 
community leaders cry out for change; law enforcement 
agencies assert that they are doing their job; federal 
investigators evaluate rogue police officers and entire 
departments; politicians debate about policies that purport 
to be tough on crime, yet strong on civil rights.”210 The report 
concluded that, in the face of seemingly endless outcry over 
abusive police tactics, the nation desperately needed a 
  
 206. See supra Part I. 
 207. DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 87, at 3. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Executive Summary, supra note 54. 
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“reasoned, systematic approach to honestly and sufficiently 
address police misconduct, once and for all.”211  
Fifteen years later, the United States has yet to solve the 
police misconduct crisis. Politicians continue to debate 
policing policies, the federal government continues to 
investigate police departments, and community leaders 
continue to cry out for change.212 Cities across the country are 
dealing with civilian populations increasingly disenchanted 
with and disenfranchised from their local police 
departments.  
The failures of existing review systems have much to do 
with this growing disgust.213 As the DOJ reported after its 
investigation of the Albuquerque Police Department, “failure 
to take meaningful remedial action . . . promotes a culture of 
unjustifiable aggression that further alienates the 
department from the communities it serves.”214 This 
alienation is not the fault of just a few rogue officers engaging 
in misconduct, although certainly they are part of the 
problem. The institutional culture within police 
departments, which has been so willing for so long to tolerate 
misconduct, must change.215 
The remainder of this Article is an effort to move cities 
toward creating the meaningful institutional change that is 
so desperately needed, by identifying the core components, 
staff, and structure of an effective independent review 
agency.  
  
 211. Id. 
 212. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 21. 
 213. See, e.g., SEATTLE INVESTIGATION, supra note 121, at 21.  
 214. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 4; see also NEW ORLEANS 
INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at xviii (concluding that as a result of inadequate 
investigations and responses to officer misconduct, police departments have little 
legitimacy in the communities they are intended to serve). 
 215. Simmons, supra note 35, at 366. 
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A. Independent Review Agencies Should Be Staffed By 
Full-time, Paid Employees 
I begin with my simplest point, but one that many cities 
have refused to recognize: independent review agencies must 
be adequately staffed by paid employees rather than 
volunteers. As Part III discusses above,216 one significant 
roadblock to successful independent review is relying on 
volunteers that have neither the time nor the resources (nor, 
in many cases, the credibility and authority) to review 
misconduct complaints in a timely manner, let alone 
implement lasting reforms.217 If cities are serious about 
changing the culture of their police departments, and 
responding effectively to civilian complaints, they will 
sufficiently staff and fund independent review agencies. 
B. To Protect Against Bias, Independent Review Agencies 
Should Be Staffed by a Diverse Array of Civilians and 
Law Enforcement Officials 
Trusting police officers to police themselves does not 
work.218 Any effective review agency must be staffed 
primarily by independent actors—individuals who are not 
employed by the police department or connected to it in any 
way. Using an external oversight model is the first step 
toward building community trust, by giving civilians a 
meaningful voice into how the police department operates 
and what measures can be taken to improve it. It also allows 
outsiders to identify deficiencies in existing police practices, 
and promotes transparency in resolving complaints about 
officer misconduct.219  
Cities must look beyond the law enforcement community 
to staff these agencies. Many independent review agencies 
are staffed primarily or exclusively by former law 
  
 216. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. 
 217. See SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 7, 40; see also CLEVELAND 
INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 37 (noting that it can take up to two years to 
complete the review process for an officer found to have committed misconduct). 
 218. See supra Part II. 
 219. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 37-38. 
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enforcement officials and prosecutors.220 A better model is one 
that incorporates input from members of the public who have 
no ties to the police department, including those who have 
been specifically critical of the police. Adding civilian voices 
to the review process forces authorities to confront the 
perspectives of the people most affected by police misconduct. 
It also adds legitimacy to the reform effort—when the public 
participates, it is more likely to support that effort and invest 
in its success.221 This very issue is playing out in Los Angeles, 
which has a five-member Board of Police Commissioners who 
serve as an oversight agency for the Los Angeles Police 
Department.222 Although the board members are civilians, 
many view them merely as well-connected political donors, 
rather than people concerned about or affected by police 
misconduct.223 In the fall of 2015, protesters began gathering 
at and disrupting the weekly Police Commission meetings, 
demanding that a minority activist be given a spot on the 
Police Commission.224 Without any voice on the Commission, 
many minorities question its impartiality and doubt its 
commitment to reform.225 
Precisely how citizens are selected to serve on an 
independent review agency may vary somewhat from city to 
city, but two examples that serve as a useful model are 
Cincinnati’s Citizen Complaint Authority and Newark, New 
Jersey’s Civilian Complaint Review Board. The Cincinnati 
Citizen Complaint Authority was formed in response to a 
class-action lawsuit by Cincinnati citizens against the City of 
Cincinnati and the Cincinnati Police Department, alleging 
widespread misconduct and racially-biased policing.226 In the 
  
 220. See supra Part III.B. 
 221. See Simmons, supra note 96, at 538-39; Simmons, supra note 53, at 409-
10. 
 222. The Function and Role of the Board of Police Commissioners, LAPD, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/900 (last 
visited May 28, 2016). 
 223. See Times Editorial Bd., supra note 67. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See id. 
 226. Collaborative Agreement at 2, In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395 
(S.D. Ohio 2002) (No. C-1-99-317). 
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six years leading up to the lawsuit, Cincinnati police had 
killed fifteen black men, and the last death—the shooting of 
Timothy Thomas at the hands of a police officer—ignited four 
days of rioting.227 
The parties to the lawsuit eventually reached a 
settlement known as the Cincinnati Collaborative 
Agreement.228 The settlement specified that the city must 
create the Citizen Complaint Authority, a civilian oversight 
agency with the mission to “investigate serious interventions 
by police officers, including but not limited to shots fired, 
deaths in custody and major uses of force, and to review and 
resolve all citizen complaints in a fair and efficient 
manner.”229 Before staffing the Citizen Complaint Authority, 
the City identified and reached out to eight different 
“stakeholder” groups: “African-Americans, social service and 
religious organizations, businesses and philanthropic groups, 
police line officers and spouses, white citizens, other 
minorities and youth.”230 The City also made online 
questionnaires available to all residents, as well as interview 
opportunities for residents who lacked computer access.231 
The parties to the settlement reported that over 3500 people 
were consulted during the process of creating the Citizen 
Complaint Authority.232 
Ultimately, the City decided to staff the Citizen 
Complaint Authority with three categories of employees: (1) 
a board of seven citizens appointed by the mayor and 
approved by the city council; (2) an Executive Director and 
support staff, appointed by the City Manager in consultation 
with the Review Board; and (3) a team of professional 
  
 227. William Freivogel, Could Police Reform in Cincinnati Provide Model for 
Ferguson?, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Oct. 19, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/
post/could-police-reform-cincinnati-provide-model-ferguson. 
 228. Collaborative Agreement at 1, In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395 
(S.D. Ohio 2002) (No. C-1-99-317). 
 229. Id. at 18.  
 230. Id. at 2. 
 231. Id. 
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investigators.233 The settlement agreement required the 
board to be comprised of a “diverse array of seven individuals, 
from a cross-section of the Cincinnati community, who have 
the requisite education and experience to impartially review 
evidence and render judgments on alleged officer 
misconduct.”234 It also specified that, to staff the board, the 
mayor would accept nominations from fifty-two different 
community councils within the city, as well as businesses, 
civic and social service agencies, and other organizations.235 
Cincinnati residents who are not nominated through any of 
these organizations can apply individually.236 To alleviate the 
concern that civilians without law enforcement experience 
might not have the requisite training or knowledge to 
effectively resolve police misconduct complaints, each 
member of the board is required, before taking office, to 
complete a basic training course that includes classes at the 
Cincinnati Police Academy, instruction in constitutional and 
criminal protections, and ride-alongs with members of the 
Cincinnati Police Department.237  
The Citizen Complaint Authority was formed in 2002 and 
remains in effect today.238 As of 2014, its board and staff 
members included a retired police sergeant who had 
previously worked with lawyers investigating lawsuits 
against the Detroit Police Department, a former probation 
officer, a youth employment coordinator for the Cincinnati 
Urban League, a customer service professional, and a graphic 
designer.239 More than ten years after it was founded, deadly 
shootings are down and use of force incidents by police 
officers have dramatically decreased, leading some to suggest 
  
 233. Id. at 18, 20. 
 234. Id. at 18. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 19. 
 238. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE art. 27, § 1 (2002). 
 239. CITY OF CINCINNATI CITIZEN COMPLAINT AUTH., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 9-10, 
http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/ccia/citizen-complaint-authority/citizen-complaint-
annual-reports/2014-annual-report.  
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that the Citizen Complaint Authority has played a 
significant role in reducing police misconduct240 
Newark, New Jersey’s recently-formed Civilian 
Complaint Review Board also stresses the importance of 
diverse civilian viewpoints informing the review of police 
misconduct claims. The Review Board is composed of nine 
members, one of whom is selected by the city’s inspector 
general, three of whom are appointed by the municipal 
council, and five of whom are voted in by specified local and 
civil rights organizations, including the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People and the ACLU.241 No 
more than one member may be a former employee of the 
Newark Police Department.242 
The recently-established Ferguson Commission offers 
another illustration for cities aiming to incorporate civilian 
viewpoints into their review agencies. Although the Ferguson 
Commission’s responsibilities extend far beyond law 
enforcement—it is tasked with assessing and addressing a 
wide array of governmental failures, from school systems to 
municipal courts—it has a working group specifically devoted 
to improving law enforcement-citizen relationships.243 This 
group tackles topics such as police use of force, anti-bias and 
cultural competency training, accountability for police 
misconduct, community policing, civilian oversight of police 
departments, and special prosecutions for officers accused of 
criminal misconduct.244  
To staff the working group, the Commission intentionally 
recruited “voices and philosophies of practice that were in 
tension with one another,” and selected members in part 
  
 240. See Freivogel, supra note 227. 
 241. Newark, N.J. Exec. Order (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.ci.newark.nj.us/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/ExecutiveOrder-CivilianComplaintReview
BoardwithRules_FINAL.pdf (establishing the Civilian Complaint Review Board); 
see Daniel Ross, Newark’s New Disciplinary Board Could Flex Rare Muscle over 
Police, YES! MAG. (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-
justice/newarks-new-civilian-board-could-wield-rare-disciplinary-muscle-over-
police-20150911. 
 242. Newark, N.J. Exec. Order, supra note 241. 
 243. FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 114, at 13-14.  
 244. Id. at 15. 
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based on the Commission’s commitment to including “diverse 
voices” in the reform process.245 The Commission concluded 
that civilians with no law enforcement experience were 
crucial to the review process “not because they are experts in 
policing, but precisely because they are not experts. Their 
insight into the day-to-day lives of average citizens is the 
perspective that law enforcement agencies need to effectively 
protect and serve the community.”246 
Having emphasized the importance of staffing review 
agencies with a diverse array of civilians representing varied 
interests and viewpoints, I acknowledge that a limited 
number of positions in review agencies—specifically, those 
requiring in-the-field investigative work—may be more 
fitting for people with law enforcement experience, simply 
because many people with training and experience as 
investigators have law enforcement backgrounds. But these 
investigators need not—and ought not—be part of the police 
department that the review agency oversees. Some states 
have incorporated similar principles into law: in Wisconsin, 
for example, all officer-involved shooting investigations are 
led by “at least two investigators . . . neither of whom is 
employed by a law enforcement agency that employs a law 
enforcement officer involved in” the shooting under 
investigation.247 In the case of a review agency, the 
investigators should be vetted to ensure they have never been 
employed by, and do not have ties with, the police 
department they are investigating. 
The most effective review agency may also include a 
designated representative from the police department under 
review, although that representative should participate only 
in an advisory capacity and have no role in investigations. I 
say this for two reasons. First, very few independent review 
agencies are authorized to require discipline for officers who 
have committed misconduct, with the usual explanation 
being that civilians are not sufficiently well-versed in 
policing procedures to understand when misconduct occurs 
and what type of discipline is appropriate. Having a 
  
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. at 30. 
 247. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, 2015 INTERIM REPORT 
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representative from the police department participate in an 
advisory role could inform the disciplinary recommendations, 
give the review agency more credibility in determining what 
discipline should be imposed, and lend leverage to the 
argument that the review agency should have power to 
require specific discipline. Second, any lasting effort to curb 
abusive conduct must transform the policing culture that 
permits—and in many cases fosters—the “us-versus-them” 
mentality so prevalent among police officers and the 
communities they are intended to serve.248 Giving civilians 
and police officers an opportunity to hear and work with each 
other could serve as a significant step toward changing that 
mentality. 
Seattle’s Citizen Police Commission, formed in 2012, is a 
rare example of an agency that intentionally incorporates the 
viewpoints of both law enforcement officials and civilians. 
The Citizen Police Commission was developed as part of a 
settlement agreement between the City of Seattle and the 
DOJ, after the DOJ found a pattern and practice of 
unconstitutional conduct by Seattle police officers.249 The 
Citizen Police Commission consists of fifteen members, 
appointed by the mayor and confirmed by city council. Two 
are required to be police officers: one representative from the 
Seattle Police Officers Guild, and another from the Seattle 
Police Management Association. The remaining thirteen 
Commission members are civilians from a wide array of 
backgrounds.250 The mayor’s office accepts applications online 
from any interested Seattle resident, and the Commission’s 
stated goal is to “represent[] . . . Seattle’s diverse population 
by selecting equally qualified members from . . . minority, 
ethnic, and faith communities, student . . . organizations, 
and any other community organizations.”251 
  
 248. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from Social 
Psychology, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 2961, 2972 (2015). 
 249. Settlement Agreement at 4, United States v. City of Seattle, No. 12-CV- 
1282 (W.D. Wash), http://www.seattle.gov/archive/mcginn/media/pdf/120727
settlementagreement.pdf.  
 250. SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 124201, at 4 (October 29, 2012), http://www.
seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/CommunityPoliceCommission/CPC%20Ord
inance%20124021.pdf. 
 251. Id. at 4-5. 
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In an attempt to ensure the Commission is staffed by a 
diverse group of civilians, the City developed a list of specific 
criteria the mayor must consider when selecting 
commissioners. Seattle’s criteria include: demonstrated 
experience working effectively with diverse populations; 
demonstrated experience working collaboratively to create 
positive change in organizations; experience with different 
aspects of the justice system (whether as prosecutor, defense 
attorney, defendant, victim, or another unspecified role); 
experience with race and social justice work, crimes against 
women, or public and mental health issues; experience with 
harm reduction models; knowledge of police policies and 
procedures; understanding of local government and city 
departments; understanding of labor policy and negotiations; 
demonstrated community leadership; and independent 
judgment.252 People with prior criminal convictions, who have 
demonstrated successful rehabilitation, are strongly 
encouraged to apply.253 In 2015, the commissioners included 
the acting captain of the Seattle Police Department, a police 
officer, two reverends, the deputy director of the Washington 
ACLU, the program coordinator for an organization called 
Youth Undoing Institutional Racism, a juvenile justice policy 
advocate, the founder of the Seattle Neighborhood Group, a 
youth worker, a behavioral health specialist, and a high-
ranking public defender.254 Six are women, and eight are 
men.255 Slightly less than one-half of the commissioners are 
members of a racial or ethnic minority.256  
In explaining why it chose to create a Commission that 
incorporates the viewpoints of both law enforcement officials 
and civilians—including many leaders of organizations 
traditionally at odds with police departments—the City of 
Seattle emphasized its belief that reform is “best developed 
  
 252. Id. at attachment 1. 
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by dialogue and wide-spread input.”257 Both community 
members and police officers brought “an important voice to 
the reform process” that could inform both the development 
and implementation of new policies and procedures.258 The 
Citizen Police Commission has already had some notable 
successes. Not long after it was founded, the Commission 
members demanded a voice in developing a new use-of-force 
policy for the police department and argued that Seattle 
police officers must be trained in de-escalation techniques, 
which community groups had long demanded but the police 
department had never been willing to implement.259 Although 
the police department initially pushed back, the end result 
was a new policy on use of force that included a significant 
de-escalation component.260 One of the notable aspects of this 
triumph was that the Commission, including the Seattle 
police union representatives as well as traditionally-
antagonistic groups such as the ACLU, presented a united 
front in demanding de-escalation training.261 Although data 
on the police department’s use of force since de-escalation 
training began is still very preliminary, a report released by 
the police department, detailing uses of force between May 
and August of 2015, showed that officers used force in less 
than two percent of interactions with people in crisis, which 
the DOJ hailed as significant progress since the 2012 finding 
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that the police department had a pattern and practice of 
using excessive force.262 
My last suggestion for staffing an independent review 
agency is that, in addition to full-time, paid staff, cities 
should allow young adults—high school or college students—
to apply for volunteer positions on the board. Young adults 
are one of the demographics most likely to suffer the effects 
of police misconduct, and in many cases are also the most 
likely to have a poor opinion of the police. Their voices should 
be heard in the reform process. A recent report suggesting 
reforms for the St. Louis County, Missouri Police Department 
made a similar proposal, recommending that the police 
department “create a board of young adult police 
commissioners made up of juniors and seniors from several 
city high schools,” whose mission would be to “bridge the gap 
between young adults and [St. Louis County] officers.”263 
Rather than creating a separate board of young adults, 
teenagers and young adults should be allowed to apply for 
volunteer positions in the review agency, adding their voice 
and lending fresh perspective to the problems that can arise 
from police misconduct. 
C. Independent Review Agencies Should Be Responsible for 
Intake of All Civilian Complaints 
Meaningful accountability for police misconduct begins 
at the intake stage of a complaint. When civilians who have 
been victims of police misconduct try to file complaints, 
requiring them to report the misconduct to other officers in 
the same police department often has, as explained in Part 
II, the effect of deterring civilians from filing the complaint 
at all. If an individual is afraid to make a complaint or 
otherwise deterred from doing so, the misconduct will never 
be reported, let alone investigated or resolved. And if the 
officer receiving the complaint does not thoroughly document 
  
 262. Brandi Kruse, Report: Seattle Police Officers Rarely Use Force Against 
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and report it to the investigating body, any hope of a fair and 
complete investigation is compromised from the outset.264  
A simple solution to these concerns is authorizing 
independent review agencies to handle the initial intake for 
all civilian complaints. These agencies should make the 
complaint-reporting process as easy as possible for civilians, 
and allow people to report complaints in person or by mail, 
email, telephone, fax, or via a complaint form on the agency’s 
website.265 In case civilians do not know to file their 
complaints with the independent review agency, police 
departments themselves should be required to post 
information in every police station, detention center, and 
courthouse about how to file a complaint, and to provide the 
appropriate information when asked by a civilian. Cities 
should also require police officers by law to notify the 
independent review agency of any civilian complaint that is 
made to an officer.266 While it may take some time and effort 
to educate the public about the options available to them for 
filing complaints, the end goal is a robust and recognized 
review agency that civilians immediately seek out when 
misconduct occurs. 
D. Independent Review Agencies Should Be Responsible for 
Tracking Early Warning Signs of Misconduct, and 
Reporting It to the Public 
In many police departments, a small minority of officers 
account for a disproportionate percentage of misconduct.267 
Early intervention systems, which typically take the form of 
software allowing authorized users to track the number and 
type of complaints incurred by a particular officer, can 
identify these officers early in their career and allow police 
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 265. Simmons, supra note 96, at 515. 
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departments—and review agencies—to pay closer attention 
to these officers.268 Early intervention software can also track 
a variety of other officer activities, including documented 
uses of force, stops, and arrests.269 
Although some police departments have early 
intervention systems in place, they have been decidedly lax 
in utilizing those systems. Albuquerque, for example, has an 
early intervention system, but it is effectively useless. The 
system tracks only limited types of misconduct, and has 
absurdly high thresholds for the number of warnings an 
officer can incur before triggering serious intervention.270 
When Albuquerque police officer Sean Wallace shot and 
killed an unarmed man in 2011, the public learned only after 
the fact that this was Wallace’s third shooting of an unarmed 
civilian. Wallace had killed his first victim in 2004, and 
wounded another in 2010, but received no discipline for 
either of these prior incidents.271 
If an independent review agency is responsible for intake 
of all civilian complaints, then the agency is also in the best 
position to track officers with repeat complaints. Using an 
early intervention system to track these officers would allow 
a review agency to recommend (or require) additional 
training for officers who are the subject of complaints, or 
identify them within the department to discourage the 
identified officers (as well as their colleagues) from future 
misconduct.272 It would also help the review agency identify 
which officers deserve serious discipline or termination for 
their misconduct: an officer who has had multiple complaints 
and continued his behavior should be removed from the force, 
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whereas an officer’s first complaint may, depending on the 
type of misconduct, deserve less serious discipline. 
In addition to tracking the number of complaints filed 
against each individual officer, review agencies should also 
report this information to the public (even if they are 
prohibited by law from identifying the officer by name). The 
Chicago Council of Lawyers, a bar association devoted to 
public interest law, has already called on Chicago’s 
Independent Police Review Authority to make available 
information that would allow the public to identify how many 
complaints each individual officer has received.273 The Review 
Authority’s current practice is to issue quarterly reports 
listing the number of complaints each officer in a given 
district received during that quarter, without identifying the 
officers by name. The Review Authority does not, however, 
provide any means of tracking whether that same officer 
continued to receive complaints after the three-month period 
had passed, nor does it indicate whether those complaints 
were sustained.274 I recommend requiring review agencies to 
issue annual reports indicating the number of complaints 
individual officers receive each year, what types of 
complaints each officer received, and a short summary of the 
factual allegations, as well as how many complaints against 
each officer were sustained, and a more detailed description 
of the sustained complaints. This would alert the public to 
repeat-offender officers and hold the police department 
accountable for keeping those officers on the force. 
The White House has also recognized the importance of 
tracking civilian complaints and invested money and effort 
into reforming early warning systems by making the 
information obtained more accessible to the public. The 
White House-sponsored Police Data Initiative, which began 
in 2015, recruits police departments that agree to submit 
their data archives on police-citizen encounters to outside 
researchers for analysis and suggestions on how the data can 
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be used to reform police departments and eliminate officers 
who engage in repeated misconduct.275 Although the 
initiative is in its early stages, it may hold promise for 
independent review agencies as well. 
E. Independent Review Agencies Should Have Authority to 
Investigate All, Rather than a Limited Subset of, 
Civilian Complaints 
Some independent review agencies are hampered in their 
efforts to reform police departments because they are 
authorized to review only certain types of misconduct. New 
York’s Civilian Complaint Review Board, for example, cannot 
review any complaints regarding false statements or perjury 
by police officers, even though the police department has a 
significant problem with officers making false statements, 
and the department’s Internal Affairs Unit has not solved the 
issue.276 Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority 
investigates misconduct complaints alleging improper use of 
force, bias-based policing, domestic violence, and officer-
involved shootings, but leaves the remainder of complaints to 
the police department’s Bureau of Internal Affairs.277 Even 
Cincinnati’s Citizen Complaint Authority, earlier cited as a 
model for agencies seeking to incorporate a wide array of 
citizens in the review process, is authorized to investigate 
only “serious interventions by police officers, including but 
not limited to shots fired, deaths in custody and major uses 
of force.”278  
Restricting review agencies in this way hinders their 
efforts to achieve meaningful reform. While officer-involved 
shootings are tragically prevalent and certainly deserve 
independent investigation, many civilian complaints involve 
  
 275. See Andrew Tarantola, White House Launches Police Data Initiative, 
ENGADGET (May 18, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/05/18/white-house-
launches-the-police-data-initiative; see also Megan Smith & Roy Austin, 
Launching the Police Data Initiative, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (May 18, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/05/18/launching-police-data-initiative. 
 276. See N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., supra note 188, at x-xi, 39-45. 
 277. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 57; see also CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-57 
(2007) (establishing IPRA). 
 278. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE art. 27, § 1 (2002). 
898 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
more mundane issues like discourtesy and verbal abuse or 
threats, which may not rise to the level of “major uses of 
force,” but nonetheless seriously impede the police 
department’s relationship with the community. Where police 
departments have proven consistently ineffective in 
addressing even these lesser forms of misconduct, 
independent review agencies should be authorized to review 
all complaints instead of a limited subset. 
F. Independent Review Agencies Must Have Sufficient 
Investigative Power to Effectively Review Complaints 
For some agencies, the obstacle lies not in what 
complaints they are authorized to review, but whether they 
can effectively review those complaints. Many independent 
review agencies lack subpoena power, and instead must base 
their investigations and conclusions almost entirely on 
whatever information the police department chooses to give 
them. Review agencies should have subpoena power. They 
should also have a presumption of access to all police files; 
cities should require police departments to disclose all 
requested files, with the only possible exception being in 
camera review by a court if the police department objects.279  
Cities should also require police officers to cooperate with 
independent review investigations. The Cincinnati 
Collaborative Agreement is an example of this. The 
Agreement provides that, as a condition of employment, all 
police officers and city employees are required to provide 
truthful and accurate information to the Citizen Complaint 
Authority when asked.280 In cases where an officer might be 
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subject to criminal penalties, the review agency may choose 
not to compel an officer’s testimony, because that testimony 
could subsequently be immunized from use in criminal 
prosecution.281 But criminal prosecutions are a rare subset of 
misconduct cases, and the agency should at least have the 
option of requiring accused officers to cooperate in the 
investigation. Enforcing such requirements could go a long 
way toward solving the problem of review agencies 
hamstrung by resistance from police departments. 
Independent review agencies should also participate in 
the immediate response to high-profile investigations, as 
soon as an incident involving potentially serious police 
misconduct occurs. Denver’s Office of the Independent 
Monitor, for example, is authorized to come to the scene of an 
officer-involved shooting, before any complaints are even 
reported, and assist in determining whether a crime 
occurred.282 Denver’s civilian monitors also observe all video 
interviews of witnesses to the shooting, and can provide 
additional questions for the officers to ask during the 
interview.283 In this way, the monitors provide civilian 
oversight as soon as the investigation starts, and reduce the 
all-too-common scenario in which the inquiry into a 
controversial incident like an officer-involved shooting is 
corrupted from the outset by departmental bias.284 
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testimony for use in administrative proceedings may be immunized from use in 
criminal prosecutions). For a discussion of the problems associated with Garrity 
immunity, see generally Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police 
Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1309 (2001). 
 282. DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 87, at 47.  
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G. Independent Review Agencies Should Avoid Stringent 
Requirements Regarding Who Can File Complaints and 
When 
As discussed in Part III, many independent review 
agencies are bound by statutes or regulations that govern, 
and in many cases restrict, the way they conduct their 
investigations. For example, some agencies are allowed to 
pursue investigations only if the complainant will sign a 
sworn affidavit; in the absence of such an affidavit the agency 
cannot continue the investigation, and the complaint is 
automatically dismissed.285 Others will not proceed without a 
signed complaint, and still others have ninety-day reporting 
deadlines; a complaint made more than ninety days after the 
alleged incident will not be accepted or investigated.286 Many 
of these rules have the (intended or unintended) effect of 
drastically reducing the number of complaints that can be 
sustained against police officers.  
Cities should authorize review agencies to proceed with 
investigations in the absence of an affidavit or signed 
complaint, or even the name of the complainant. Particularly 
in cases involving threats or abuse by police officers, it is easy 
to understand why some complainants are not comfortable 
providing their full names and a sworn complaint. A recent 
report on the St. Louis County Police Department warned 
that the department may be limiting civilian complaints even 
by putting a signature line on the complaint form—
suggesting that the complaint must be signed before filing—
and also by failing to inform the public that anonymous 
complaints are permitted.287 The report recommended that 
the signature line be removed and that all printed material, 
  
Teen: Why Wisconsin’s Investigation Will Be Different, CNN (Mar. 10, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/10/us/wisconsin-police-shooting-rules.  
 285. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 286.  ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 38-39, 43. 
 287. NORTON ET AL., supra note 195, at 8-9, 102. 
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as well as the department’s website, make clear that 
anonymous complaints will be accepted.288  
Cities should also eliminate strict deadlines for filing of 
complaints. In Cincinnati, the Citizen Complaint Authority 
is authorized to review complaints submitted within one year 
of the date of an incident; even complaints submitted after 
that one-year period may still be reviewed in the discretion 
of the Executive Director.289 Although a relatively small 
number of complaints may be filed more than ninety days 
after the complained-of conduct, one can easily imagine good 
reasons for letting those complaints be reviewed: for 
example, if the complainant was arrested during the 
complained-of incident, and had no opportunity to report the 
misconduct until after he was released. 
H. Independent Review Agencies Should Have Authority to 
Impose Discipline, Rather than Make Recommendations 
the Police Department Is Free To Reject 
Authorizing independent review agencies to impose 
discipline would be a significant step toward enforcing the 
kinds of reform that police departments themselves are so 
reluctant to adopt. In early 2015, the mayor of Newark, New 
Jersey, Ras Baraka, formed a Civilian Complaint Review 
Board believed to be the first independent review agency 
authorized to impose discipline that the police department 
cannot, except in rare circumstances, refuse.290 When 
Newark’s Civilian Complaint Review Board substantiates a 
complaint against an officer and proposes discipline, the 
police department must impose that discipline unless the 
police chief appears in person and convinces the Board that 
its decision was erroneous.291  
  
 288. Police officers themselves, of course, rely heavily on anonymous complaints 
in investigating criminal activity. E.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 326-28 
(1990). 
 289. CITY OF CINCINNATI CITIZEN COMPLAINT AUTH., supra note 239, at 11. 
 290. Ross, supra note 241. 
 291. See id.; see also Newark, N.J. Exec. Order, supra note 241. 
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Although Newark’s model is untested, it holds great 
promise. Currently, most independent review agencies 
recommend only minor discipline for major problems, likely 
because they know the police department is less likely to 
follow their recommendations if the discipline is severe.292 To 
create true reform, serious misconduct must be met with 
appropriate discipline. Untruthfulness, for example, is an 
enormous problem in police departments across the country: 
police officers have a deserved reputation for covering up for 
their colleagues at almost any cost, even when major 
misconduct has occurred. A recent report assessing Chicago’s 
Independent Police Review Authority suggested that, when 
the agency finds that a police officer “deliberately concealed 
or failed to disclose information” about a fellow officer’s 
misconduct, the agency should automatically recommend 
dismissal from the force.293 The DOJ came to the same 
conclusion in Ferguson, recommending that officers found to 
have been untruthful in the performance of their duties, 
including responding to misconduct investigations, be 
terminated.294 The same harsh discipline is needed for proven 
incidents of racial bias or discrimination. There is no excuse 
for racially-biased or discriminatory policing, and its 
prevalence on police forces is a testament only to how 
unacceptably long police departments have tolerated such 
pernicious prejudice.  
Resistance by police departments and unions to civilian 
oversight can be expected, particularly when the civilian 
review agency is authorized to actually impose discipline, 
rather than merely make recommendations. In Newark, 
after the city council approved creation of the Civilian 
Complaint Review Board, the police union immediately 
responded by saying that it intended to file a lawsuit 
challenging the authority of the Board.295 But Newark is 
combating this resistance by emphasizing the widespread 
  
 292. See supra pp. 880-81 (detailing the minor discipline recommended by 
Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority, and the numerous options police 
officials and the officers under review have for disregarding or appealing those 
recommendations). 
 293. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 4-5, 23. 
 294. FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 96. 
 295. Porter, supra note 181. 
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support that the Civilian Complaint Review Board enjoys at 
both the national and local level. Before the city council voted 
on the Civilian Complaint Review Board, twenty-six national 
and local civilian organizations, including Black Lives 
Matter, the Boys and Girls Club of Newark, the New Jersey 
Working Families Alliance, numerous Latino organizations, 
and even the National Organization of Black Law 
Enforcement Executives, signed a letter in support of the 
Board.296 Mayor Baraka and Newark’s Public Safety Director 
also read statements in support of the Board.297 The city 
council approved the Review Board in a unanimous vote, and 
after the police union threatened a lawsuit, Mayor Baraka 
encouraged the police to “embrace the opportunity the board 
would offer to increase transparency and accountability.”298 
The union has not yet followed through on its threat to sue. 
Relatedly, when review agencies find that an officer’s 
misconduct rose to the level of a crime, they should be 
allowed to require that a special prosecutor, who does not 
have a working relationship with the police department or 
officer under investigation, be appointed to determine 
whether criminal charges are appropriate. Prosecutions of 
police officers are extremely rare. Over a five-year period 
from 2010 to 2014 the Albuquerque Police Department 
managed to kill twenty-eight people (a per-capita kill rate 
eight times that of the New York Police Department), and 
until 2014 not one of the officers involved in those twenty-
eight killings had been charged with any crime.299 The 
District Attorney’s office in New Orleans also routinely 
refuses to prosecute police officers who commit crimes. In one 
particularly disturbing example, the office twice declined to 
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prosecute a New Orleans police officer accused of indecent 
behavior with a juvenile and rape; the officer remained on the 
police force until he was accused in a third case of forcibly 
raping and molesting a juvenile, and finally charged.300 In 
Cincinnati, the 2015 murder indictment of University of 
Cincinnati officer Ray Tensing, for the shooting death of 
Samuel DuBose, was the first time any officer in the county 
had ever been charged with murder for killing a civilian while 
on duty.301 Given prosecutors’ cowardly track records when it 
comes to filing charges against police officers, and the close 
relationship they often have with the officers they are called 
upon to prosecute, review agencies should have authority to 
appoint a special prosecutor when they find that officers have 
committed criminal misconduct. 
The Ferguson Commission report made this point, 
recommending that independent review agencies be “[a]ble 
and authorized to investigate potential criminal wrongdoing 
by officers and to make recommendations for prosecutions 
that are then evaluated by special prosecutors.”302 These 
kinds of reforms could be a significant step toward 
eliminating the lethargy and institutional bias that has 
allowed misconduct to proliferate, but they will not be 
possible if the findings of the review agency are only 
suggestions. Agencies must be given power to enforce their 
findings.  
CONCLUSION 
After Samuel DuBose—an unarmed black man pulled 
over for a minor traffic violation—was shot and killed by 
Cincinnati police officer Ray Tensing in July of 2015, 
Hamilton County Prosecutor Joe Deters almost immediately 
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vowed to charge Tensing with murder.303 Deters’s blunt 
determination took some by surprise. In his press conference 
announcing his decision to file murder charges, he told the 
gathered crowd, “look . . . we’re gonna follow the law in this 
office and we are going, if the facts fit the law, we’re gonna 
pursue that no matter if you’re a police officer or you’re Pope 
Francis, I don’t care who you are, we’re gonna go after you.”304 
Officer Tensing’s criminal case has not yet been resolved, 
and it remains to be seen whether he will be convicted for 
DuBose’s murder. But the promise Deters’s statement 
embodies—that police officers who mistreat civilians will not 
get away with it simply because of their status or office—is a 
sadly elusive one for many people, particularly the minorities 
who are so disproportionately victims of police misconduct. 
Our nation’s police departments desperately need to be 
reformed. That reform must take place on many levels, but 
one piece of it is ending—at long last—the practice of trusting 
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